Take a look at some excerpts (below) from the transcript of a PBS Frontline special that aired in 1993. The news show zeroed in on a similar aerial surveillance system deployed by U.S. Customs, which is now part of DHS.

The 1993 Customs program, known as aerostat, was sold to the American public as the greatest thing since sliced bread. But it proved to be a “boondoggle,” due in large part to the weather and geography realities of the border.

I wonder if this PBS transcript will be reviewed before the big “contracts” are awarded for DHS’ drone-clone version of aerostat on the border?

What happened to the Drug War? (Frontline, originally aired Feb. 2, 1993)

Excerpts

…. U.S. Sen. DeCONCINI: The aerostat program, which is a great, big balloon filled with gases that keep it afloat at 10,000 to 12,000 or more feet above the earth with a radar system in it, but with no personnel in it-that radar system circles and reaches out 150 miles and detects anything that is moving. And I don't know of any other system that could do this.

…. CAROL HALLETT: Former Customers Commissioner: The aerostat balloons have been one of the greatest deterrents that has come along, in terms of a border net, and it's just part of the overall strategy of defending our borders, and a very successful strategy when you realize that the-for all intents and purposes, the air war has been won along the southern border.

…. NARRATOR: To bolster the aerostats, Customs operates a fleet of P3 radar planes which cost $30 million each. Like the aerostats, they are equipped with downward-looking radar to search for smugglers' aircraft. Another key element in Customs' surveillance and pursuit strategy is the $5.5 million Blackhawk helicopter.

BLACKHAWK PILOT: [subtitles] The concept of the radar fence is good, but in reality it hasn't proven effective, which is obvious by the problems with the aerostats, specifically in Texas, in that they're not up.

NARRATOR: Aerostats are vulnerable to weather-related damage. The three Texas aerostats have been plagued with problems. In Marfa, high winds tore an aerostat into four pieces in January, 1992. In Rio Grande City, strong winds snapped the tether of another. Repairs cost $1 million. In Eagle Pass, one broke free and crashed 40 miles away.

Sen. DeCONCINI: Oh, we've had a lot of problems with the aerostats, a lot of them. Number one, the problem with the aerostat is they can't fly in inclement weather, so they're down. They average between 70 and 72 percent time they're up.

Mr. ROSENBLOOM [with Frontline]: What if you were told they operated at 39 percent?

…. NARRATOR: FRONTLINE has obtained the official 1992 work logs. What the Senator is apparently not including in his figures is the down time of the aerostats because of weather-related accidents. When included, the average flying time isn't 70 percent, as the Senator claims. It's only 39.9 percent.

Jack Blum was a staff counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, specializing in drug policy matters.

JACK BLUM: The aerostats are a tremendous boondoggle. As far as I'm concerned, they're a total waste of money on all sides and, in fact, almost laughable.

Mr. ROSENBLOOM: Why?

Mr. BLUM: First of all, the aerostats have to come down in a high wind. And if the smugglers wait long enough, the wind goes up, the aerostats come down and in they come.

NARRATOR: Smugglers can also profit from the camouflage of mountainous terrain. The Baboquivari range south of the Port Huachuca aerostat in Arizona is one example.

MR. [FRANK] AULT [former Customs adviser]: The cold, hard facts of life are that over 60 percent of what that aerostat can see at Fort Huachuca is masked by rocks. We were very good, technically, but we haven't invented a radar that can see through rocks.

NARRATOR: And this 1989 report by Congress's General Accounting Office describes another problem with the aerostats. The report found that when smugglers fly under 500 feet, aerostats "have difficulty distinguishing such aircraft ... from surface clutter," such as cars.

… NARRATOR: In 1989, NBC News correspondent Brian Ross reported on the close relationship between DeConcini and Parry and Romani. The report suggested the lobbyists had cashed in on their political connections. The facts are there. President Romano Romani, seen here with the Senator, once worked on DeConcini's Senate staff. Robert Mills was also an aide to Senator DeConcini before he joined Parry and Romani. He had worked with DeConcini on the original air interdiction legislation. And Ted Mehl-he also worked on the aerostat legislation as a Congressional aide. He then became Parry and Romani's chief Congressional lobbyist for the aerostats.

In 1991, Parry and Romani's connections apparently paid off when it successfully lobbied for the funding of four new aerostats. Parry and Romani's client, a company called TCOM, also won the lion's share of the contract, worth more than $100 million.

Jack Blum became familiar with Parry and Romani's connections to DeConcini while working as a Senate investigator in the late 1980s.

Mr. BLUM: What I'm saying is that former staff very effectively sold the program to their boss. And there's a lot of money here and the contractors who want that went to this group of former staff and said, "Hey, sell it to the boss." Now, that has gone on all the time and it has happened with great frequency.

NARRATOR: What has also happened is that DeConcini has benefited. These Federal Election Commission reports from Senator DeConcini's re-election campaign list the following contributors: Parry and Romani lobbyists; Charles Craig, a TCOM owner; and numerous PACs of air interdiction manufacturers. Together they have contributed thousands of dollars since 1989. We asked DeConcini about the Parry and Romani contributions.

Sen. DeCONCINI: The fact that they contribute to my campaign, I would more suspect it's not because they're doing business with Customs, it's because they know me, because I worked with-they worked for me or they feel I'm an honest candidate.

Let the bidding begin!