Corruption alleged in U.S. Customs' Miami operations

Those charges are outlined in a letter the attorney, John Cavicchi, sent last month to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card. In addition to raising the corruption allegations, Cavicchi’s letter also advocates that the current commissioner of CBP, Robert Bonner, be replaced by Mark Conrad, a former U.S. Customs regional supervisor who has earned a reputation as a government whistleblower.

CBP, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, employs some 41,000 people charged with managing, controlling and protecting the U.S. borders. Cavicchi’s charges take aim at the South Florida operations of CBP -- specifically Miami, one of the busiest seaside entry points in the country.

Cavicchi gained national prominence as the lawyer for Louis Greco, who was convicted in Boston of being party to a 1965 mob-related assassination. Greco, a disabled WWII veteran, spent some 30 years in prison, all the while contending he was innocent. Cavicchi took on Greco’s case in 1977, after his conviction, trying to prove he was framed. That proof finally surfaced in 2000 as part of a Justice Department task force investigation into the incestuous relationship between the FBI and infamous Boston underworld figures Stephen Flemming and Whitey Bulger.

As part of that task force investigation, documents surfaced showing that, in an effort to protect their informants, FBI agents had suppressed evidence of Greco’s innocence in the gangland murder. Unfortunately, it was too late for Greco, who died in prison of colon cancer and heart disease in 1995.

Cavicchi contends the same kind of moral bankruptcy that led to the tragic fate of Greco is at play among the management of the Miami CBP operations.

Peeping feds

In June 2002, former Customs inspector Marlon Marrero was sentenced to 60 months in federal prison after being convicted of stealing drugs that he had confiscated from suspects in a hospital ward -- where they had been taken by Customs inspectors to defecate.

“The excrement is rinsed and examined for contraband in this room. When pellets containing contraband are discovered, the inspectors remove the pellets and place them into a container,” court records in Marrero's case state.

Marrero allegedly was keeping some of these “pellets” for later resale. As a result, surveillance was set up on Marrero at a several night clubs in the Miami area in early 2001, where he was observed making drug deals with a government informant, according to court records.

“The conversations between the CI (confidential informant) and inspector Marlon Marrero … were visually monitored by agents who observed these discussions,” states an affidavit of a Customs agent in the case. “During the conversation between inspector Marlon Marrero and the CI, inspector Marlon Marrero offered to give the CI white powder, “G” (GHB), or 3, 4 … (hits of) Ecstasy.”

The problem with the Marrero case, however, according to Cavicchi, is what happened with the surveillance set up on the Customs side of the equation – in the hospital ward where Marrero was allegedly stealing the drugs from suspects. Internal Affairs agents on the case suspected that Marrero was not acting alone, so they sought a court order to set up surveillance on inspectors in the hospital ward at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami.

To catch Marrero and his alleged accomplices in the act, Customs Internal Affairs sought and obtained a court order in March 2001 authorizing them to set up video surveillance in the hospital ward. But the order was very specific, authorizing only the “interception of visual, non-verbal conduct and activities.”

But about a month after the surveillance went hot, Internal Affairs ran into a problem. Two inspectors in the hospital ward had spotted the clandestine peeping equipment. The inspectors informed their supervisors of their discovery. Eventually, the matter landed on the desk of Thomas Winkowski, the Service Port Director in Miami.

Winkowski then contacted one of the Internal Affairs agents overseeing the covert surveillance, David Marwell. He asked Marwell what he should tell his staff if he was questioned about the surveillance equipment.

“David Marwell told me to take a middle of the road approach by neither confirming or denying whom the cameras belong to,” states an affidavit Winkowski submitted in September 2002 as part of a later investigation into the surveillance activities. “I followed those instructions.”

In essence, according to Cavicchi, Winkowski was instructed to withhold the truth from the inspectors who had discovered the surveillance equipment. As a result, assuming it was not an Internal Affairs operation, and suspecting it might be a voyeur or some other illegal surveillance activity, the inspectors removed the equipment from the hospital ward.

That’s when the crap hit the fan. The inspectors soon found themselves facing possible termination from their jobs and were put under the spotlight of an Internal Affairs investigation themselves.

Why? Well, Cavicchi states the following in his letter to the White House:

There is also an issue of illegal audio surveillance by Miami Internal Affairs, and the deliberate lying by current director of field operations, Thomas S.Winkowski … who was told by Internal Affairs to lie, and, in fact, did lie to Customs inspectors who discovered the audio. Winkowski then tried to have the inspectors fired for removing the equipment.

Audio surveillance, as I understand the law, requires an application to the Attorney General and approval by a federal district court judge. In this case, there was approval for video surveillance by a federal magistrate.

That’s right. Cavicchi contends that Internal Affairs broke the law by setting up audio and video surveillance in the hospital ward. Once the inspectors discovered the equipment, the Internal Affairs operation was compromised, but more importantly, the inspectors now had evidence of the illegal nature of the Internal Affairs sting.

“The Internal Affairs operation was blown,” says Conrad, who has years of experience running Internal Affairs projects. “If they knew the operation was compromised, and all they had in there was video, why didn’t they (Internal Affairs) simply take it down and leave it alone?

“My guess is that they suspected the inspectors had discovered the audio, and they went after the inspectors to scare them off.”

CBP officials would not allow Winkowski or others involved in the Marrero case to speak to Narco News.

What evidence is there that audio surveillance was part of the equation? Well, in at least two affidavits and in two interviews conducted by Internal Affairs agents Marwell and Samuel Weitz following the discovery of the surveillance equipment, the agents themselves refer to audio surveillance being present.

For example, in an interview conducted with one of the inspectors who removed the surveillance gadgets, an interview conducted jointly by Weitz and Marwell on March 12, 2002, Weitz asks the inspector the following:

“Are you aware of events surrounding the discovery of a hidden audio recorder transmitter device at JMH (Jackson Memorial Hospital), Ward D?”

In a written affidavit submitted by one of the inspectors involved, which is signed by both Weitz and Marwell, the following question is asked:

“Are you aware of events surrounding the discovery of ‘hidden audio/recorder/transmitter device(s)’ at JMH Ward D?”

Cavicchi sums it up this way: “The inspectors detected the surveillance and called Winkowski, and he denied it was Internal Affairs equipment, so they removed it. If it was not a nefarious operation, Internal Affairs should have just said it was their equipment and told the inspectors to leave it alone.”

Can of worms

If, as Cavicchi charges, the Internal Affairs surveillance in the hospital ward did involve audio, the implications for those involved are serious, criminal in fact, according to sources within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Customs operations were reorganized under DHS in 2003.

“If they used audio, then it is a violation of federal law, and the people involved should be prosecuted,” says one DHS agent, who asked to remain anonymous. “The law is very clear on this. If you use illegal methods, you bring into question all the evidence. How could you believe anything they say in court?”

The DHS agent also stresses that any law enforcement officers who are aware of such criminal activity are required to report it. That could put Marwell, Weitz and Winkowski in a serious jam, if audio was part of the surveillance equation. And both Winkowski and Weitz now hold high-profile positions in Customs under DHS.

Winkowski, now director of field operations, is the top dog for Customs and Border Protection operations in South Florida. Marwell has since been promoted to a plum job as the Customs attaché in Bern, Switzerland.

The audio glitch also opens up a can of worms in the case of Merrero, who is slated to be released from prison next summer, according to his attorney, Joseph Rosenbaum.

Rosenbaum says he did not become aware of the hospital-ward surveillance until early November of this year. The evidence was never brought up in Marrero’s prosecution.

Rosenbaum says Marrero confessed to the crime based on other evidence in the case.

“But if they used the (audio) surveillance as a basis for getting that confession, then everything in the case goes,” Rosenbaum says. “If there was illegal surveillance involved, then those involved violated a court order.”

Rosenbaum adds that in the wake of the revelation about the surveillance, he plans to contact his client to “see if he wants me to review the case.”

Cavicchi says the inspectors involved in removing the surveillance survived the Internal Affairs investigation and their brush with being fired.

“When Customs found out there was a problem with the audio, they gave them (the inspectors) oral reprimands,” Cavicchi says. But he stresses they were the victims and that justice is far from being served in this case.

CBP spokesman Zachary Mann declined to comment on the allegations raised by Cavicchi. Mann claims they “do not contain all of the facts and issues.”

Cavicchi replied to Mann’s brush-off by e-mail:  

I have reviewed the record of Mr. Marrero's case and there are no court documents or other evidence authorizing the use of audio surveillance at the Jackson Memorial Hospital. Nor could I find in the court record any reference to video and/or audio surveillance at the Jackson Memorial Hospital. I have notified Mr. Marrero's attorney.

Planting evidence

The Marrero case does not stand alone as an illustration of the problems with Customs operations in Miami, according to Cavicchi. He also questions why the current port director in Miami, Jose Ramirez, still has a job.  

In 1994, Ramirez admitted to Internal Affairs investigators that he planted two joints in the luggage of an African American couple who were passengers on a cruise ship. He then busted the couple for the dope when they disembarked. Ramirez claimed to have found the joints sitting on a table in the passengers’ cabin.

At least one Customs inspector, who asked not to be named, is suspicious of the veracity of Ramirez’ version of how the dope found its way into the luggage.

“You are getting ready to disembark a cruise vessel, and you leave two joints on a table while you go to have breakfast?” the inspector says. “At least make your story believable.”

Ramirez’s supervisor at the time “orally admonished him” for his actions and Internal Affairs decided “not to make any findings of improper conduct, and concluded in a report dated Aug. 4, 1994: ‘No further action is anticipated …,’” court records related to the case state.

Federal and local prosecutors declined to pursue the charges against the passengers. Instead, they were issued a citation and small fine, after admitting the marijuana was theirs.

Court documents state that after the cruise ship frame-up, “the Office of Internal Affairs … received an anonymous phone call regarding the incident and an anonymous letter, in which the author alleged (Ramirez) routinely planted drugs on cruise ship passengers.”

Cavicchi points out in his letter to the White House that “Ramirez has been promoted three times since he planted the marijuana.” He became port director in June 2003, and now oversees CBP operations at one of the highest-profile ports in the nation.

Ramirez’ lapse in ethics also resulted in a letter from Customs in 1999 that stated his conduct in the 1994 incident “disables (him) from service as a witness or affiant in criminal cases.” Sources within DHS indicate that it is not likely that a port director will be called to testify in a criminal trial – although they add that port directors are occasionally asked to testify before Congress.

The bigger issue with respect to Ramirez, according to law enforcement sources, is the question of integrity.

“Is he going to discipline an employee who plants evidence, since he did the same thing and got away with it?” one federal agent asks. “Is he going to protect the civil rights of citizens who claim they are the victims of evidence being planted?

“Planting evidence is the worst thing a law enforcement officer can do. Why should the American people trust an agency that promotes someone who violates their oath? Someone like that has no business being in law enforcement, and the agency should take responsibility for this. They have failed the American public.”

When contacted by Narco News, Ramirez declined to comment, other than to say “it’s been investigated many times and there were no findings of wrongdoing.”

Mann also declined to comment on the Ramirez case. He stresses that both the surveillance and Ramirez cases involve “matters which have long been resolved, some dating back more than 16 years.”

Mann’s 16-years remark refers to another incident involving Ramirez. “In 1990, (Ramirez) received a five-day suspension for a 1988 incident in which he had been accused of drinking alcohol and using obscene language while on duty in uniform,” court records state.

Cavicchi, in an e-mail response to Mann, adds the following:

The issues regarding Mr. Ramirez were not resolved until June 11, 2003, when a United States Magistrate Judge (Garber) stated:

“Without question, Defendant (Customs) could have relied on Plaintiff's (Ramirez's) actions related to the 1994 cruise ship incident not only to deny Plaintiff's reassignment request, but also to terminate Plaintiff's employment. ... The parties have produced disturbing evidence, including the fact that in spite of Plaintiff's conduct, Defendant has not only continued to employ him, but has repeatedly promoted him.”

After this decision, the agency promoted Mr. Ramirez to Port Director.

Changing of the guard?

Cavicchi believes Customs is in need of radical reform. That's why he is backing Conrad for the commissioner’s post at Customs and Border Protection.

Cavicchi says Conrad has “integrity” and the will to clean up the agency. Conrad admits, though, that his bid for the post is a long shot, one that is not likely to succeed absent a grassroots movement within the agency.

Conrad now works as an assistant professor of criminal justice at Troy University in Alabama and as a legal advocate for federal law-enforcement employees who have discrimination and whistleblower claims against the government. Conrad, a 27-year Customs veteran who retired in 1998, rose through the agency’s ranks to take on the post of Supervisory Agent in Charge of Customs Internal Affairs – a position in which he had responsibility for a nine-state area and two foreign locations.

While with Customs as a supervisor in Internal Affairs, Conrad says he made some enemies, because he played by the book.

“We were just looking for the facts, and not trying to satisfy some manager who might want those facts to change,” he says. “I’ve been asked to change testimony, or to leave stuff out of reports, or to clear individuals, or to make people appear guilty. My response was always, ‘No fucking way.’”

Conrad says if he somehow got the nod as commissioner, “one of the first things I would do is restore the morale of the people in the agency.”

“I’d get the mean, vindictive, retaliatory spirit out of there,” he adds. “This stuff needs to end, now.”

Conrad says he would address the problems in the agency systematically, by identifying the bad supervisors and changing the guard. He also would set up an assessment program to identify early on those within the agency who have supervisory skills or potential and assure those people are put on track to succeed in those posts. In a nutshell, the cronyism within the agency would come to an end.

“This can’t be done overnight, but people have to know the future is bright, and that there are opportunities for good people to advance,” Conrad stresses.

Conrad says he sent an application to the White House in November advancing his name as a candidate for the commissioner’s post at CBP. Conrad adds that he also put his hat in the ring for two other leadership posts within DHS – Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Office of Inspector General – where he says his experience lines up well with the job requirements.

Cavicchi, for his part, says CBP operates now “like an organized crime family.”

He says the problems at CBP, as evidenced by its Miami operations, are particularly vexing in light of 9/11 and DHS’s charge to protect national security.

“What the hell kind of people do we have in law enforcement?” he asks. “It’s sickening. I just hope we can get someone like Mark (Conrad) in there to turn things around.”

White House officials failed to return calls to Narco News. However, Cavicchi did receive confirmation that his letter, including the allegations of corruption raised in the letter, had been received by the White House.

“Thank you for recommending David Mark Conrad for a position in the Bush Administration,” states a Nov. 8 letter to Cavicchi from Dina Powell, assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel. “Please be assured that your candidate will receive full consideration as we work to select those to serve the President of the country.”