Turning a Blind Eye? US Customs Ignores Allegations of Colombian Air Force Smuggling for Four Years

The Colombian Air Force C-130 cargo plane, tail number FAC 1005, touched down at Ft. Lauderdale International Airport on November 9, 1998.  It was a twice-monthly flight to pick up engine parts from the Colombian Air Force’s purchasing office and warehouse, located in the general aviation area of Ft. Lauderdale International Airport.  The plane carried a crew of six and six passengers.  This evening was different, as Customs agents were waiting to pounce on the aircraft.  A British government source had provided a tip “that a Colombian Air Force Aircraft due to arrive into Ft. Lauderdale general aviation facility would contain narcotics.”   The Port Everglades Anti-Smuggling Unit moved quickly, searching the plane with two canine units and two additional inspectors.  Two special agents lay in wait.  Within moments one of the dogs had alerted to a series of pallets onboard.  The inspectors, claiming to have noticed “unusual rivets and a smell of glue,” drilled into one of the pallets.  The drill bit emerged coated in cocaine dust.  Upon disassembling the pallets, a total of 700 bags were discovered.  The haul was 1639 pounds with a street value of $12.7 million.

Days after the initial seizure, the Colombian government received information that FAC 1005 might have also been carrying heroin, and forwarded this to Customs.  The plane’s cargo netting was searched, and thirteen pounds of heroin was discovered.  It was a large and embarrassing seizure, warranting initial coverage in the New York Times, Washington Post, and on CNN.  Yet the story quickly disappeared, with no follow-up in the mainstream media.  Newly-declassified documents concerning this incident, released under the Freedom of Information Act to College of DuPage Professor Keith Yearman, raise serious questions about this incident and the role of US Customs.

Suspects

After the seizure, Colombian President Andres Pastrana questioned the timing of the seizure.  His question was logical – why didn’t Customs wait to see who would pick up the cocaine?  Instead Customs agents concentrated their efforts on FAC 1005’s crew and the employees of the Colombian Air Force office at Ft. Lauderdale.  All were given polygraph examinations.

The six members of the flight crew were given polygraphs on November 16.  Two of the exams were considered deceptive and one inconclusive.  Of the 21 Colombian Air Force ground personnel at Ft. Lauderdale, eight polygraphs returned deceptive with another inconclusive.  

The passengers, a family of five and an unaccompanied female, were not given polygraphs.  The unaccompanied female “was not detained and departed the area.  A subsequent interview of this female confirmed she was visiting her daughter who [was] expecting a child in two weeks,” according to Customs’ November 25, 1998 Report of Investigation.  The family of five included a former high-ranking officer of the Colombian Air Force, his wife and three children.  The adults were questioned and released.

Of note, in the Customs report of November 25, the flight crew are named, as is the unaccompanied female (though the names were redacted in Freedom of Information Act review).  However, the names of the family of five do not appear in the report – omitted entirely - perhaps an effort to avoid further embarrassing the Colombian government.

Customs agents seemed comfortable in fingering warehouse employees, but no prosecutions would occur in the United States.  As Custom’s closing report of January 9, 2000 noted, “Possible targets who were employed at the Colombian Air force [sic] warehouse have been allowed to return to Colombia.  Toll records and analysis, interviews, background checks, financial records, security gate access records, fingerprint analysis, translations of debriefing reports provided by the Colombian prosecutors office, and debriefings of the investigative team provided by various heads of the Colombian government have failed to provide a viable target in the United States.”

Turning a Blind Eye?

According to Customs’ November 25, 1998 Report of Investigation, “Since 1994, the RAIC [Resident Agent in Charge] Ft. Lauderdale and The Office of Field Operations have received numerous reports indicating that Colombian Military Aircraft were being utilized to transport contraband into Ft. Lauderdale International Airport.”  Yet the November 1998 bust appears to have been Customs’ first activity or seizure involving the Colombian Air Force facility.

This prompts a question as to why November 1998 was the first action against the Colombian Air Force, and how much cocaine was brought in during those four years.  It also prompts further questions concerning how far up the drug-smuggling went.  A newly-released cable from the US Embassy in Bogota, dated November 19, 1998, may provide some insight as to the latter question:

“Colombian radio network Caracol aired November 13 an interview with Attorney General Jaime Bernal Cuellar.  During the interview Bernal allegedly said that undoubtedly, there are U.S. officials and possibly U.S. military officers involved in the case of the seizure of approximately half a ton of cocaine aboard a Colombian Air Force plane.  Bernal is alleged to have said that he cannot explain why the corresponding operation that would have enabled the identification of the people who were in charge of receiving the drugs was not conducted as the U.S. military base.  Bernal finally said, ‘I have no doubts that there was a major international network there in charge of receiving the shipment.  It is a military airport, and therefore, U.S. military officers may be involved.”

The Colombian government arrested seven individuals in connection with the case.  According to Customs’ closing report, “Information provided by several sources of information suggests that the seven individuals currently under arrest in Colombia in connection with this investigation are facilitators and low level employees of a high ranking consortium of Colombian Air force [sic] officers who have utilized their official positions within the Colombian Air force [sic] to facilitate the smuggling of cocaine and heroin to the United States.”

Here’s where the story gets more intriguing.  When Customs approached the British government for a debriefing of the original source of information, the request was denied.  Whether this was a way to make the investigation disappear on behalf of the U.S. government or if the British had a legitimate interest in protecting this source is unclear.  

After an initial flurry of news reports on the bust, the story disappeared.   No reporters probed Raymond Kelly, the then-Commissioner of the Customs Service, nor did they press the State Department or the White House.  What should have been, at minimum, an extremely-embarrassing moment (or even resulted in a Congressional investigation) was quickly shoved aside, never to be raised again by the media.  

Just how pervasive was/is narcotrafficking within the Colombian military?  U.S. Customs’ closing report identified the group within the Colombian Air Force as the “Blue Cartel,” but the head of the Colombian Air Force denied its existence.  How high up the chain of command did this go, and was there complicity within the U.S. military or U.S. Customs, or both?

These questions may never be answered.  However, given the ever-expanding involvement of the U.S. in Colombia and the growth of interdiction efforts (such as the expansion of US Customs, now part of Customs & Border Protection), perhaps it is time to reexamine FAC 1005 and the US government’s response and/or involvement in this incident.