Argentina: Democracy in Transition

I wrote this for my Argentine History class.  I would like for everyone who reads this to critique it.  Thanks.  Note it is fairly long. December of 2001 marked a turning point not only for Argentina but also for Latin America in general.  This month saw massive popular protest against the government of Fernando De la Rúa.  What differentiated this protest from many others in Latin America was that the cacerolazos, middle class people banging on pots and pans as a protest against the government, had joined with the piqueteros, unemployed activists.(1)   This protest that crossed class lines occurred against a backdrop of widespread looting of supermarkets by the impoverished masses.  The popular uprising forced De la Rúa to resign the Presidency on December 20, after 29 young people had been killed by the government in a crackdown “the likes of which had never before been ordered by an elected Argentine government.(2)”

    A default on Argentina’s debt to the IMF forced De la Rúa’s finance minister, Domingo Cavallo, to take a drastic measure to maintain payment on the IMF loan that would begin the popular revolt.  The spark, which began the eruption of popular discontent, was the limiting of cash withdrawals as well as the payment of pensions and salaries.  The measure gave Argentina the necessary funds to maintain payment of the debt as well as preventing an exodus of funds from the nation’s banks.  However, this forced all Argentines to use checks and credit cards as the only means of payment.  For a people unused to relying on the banking system such restrictions were unacceptable.(3)  

    Argentina’s experience with the Neoliberal economic policy was by no means unique as most, if not all, nations in Latin America implemented some form of Neoliberal economic policy or free market reforms since the 1980’s.  However, the Argentine peoples’ forceful rejection of Neoliberal economics marked the collapse of the economic model implemented in Latin America during the preceding twenty years.  The collapse of the current economic system tested not only the ability of Argentine democracy to survive but also the ability of the Argentine people to remake and reform their society into a more just and equitable one.  This test of Argentine society continues to this day in the form of conflict between the masses of working class, who may or may not be employed, and the powerful elites who had wielded power and influence out of proportion to their numbers.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the progress and setbacks of those reforms in Argentina during the past two years.

    The changes in Argentina since December of 2001 impacted every facet of Argentine society including the political sphere, social policy, international relations, economic production, and the media have changed since the failure of the free market economy.  The nature of the change often had to do with how Argentine society has been reforming itself often in conjunction with grassroots organizations.  The resurgence of popular participation in whatever form has been the single greatest change in Argentine history.  In fact the protests of December 2001 were simply the most extreme form of popular participation in Argentine society.  The popular participation influenced the political realm by contributing to the election of the progressive Nestor Kirchner as president.  The progressive influence on the political sphere in turn determined how Argentina would interact internationally, especially with her neighbors, the United States and international finance groups.  Despite the influence wielded by these grassroots organizations the government of Argentina has taken steps to reduce the power of such organizations, especially the piqueteros, through repression.  Popular participation later influenced economic production when owners of factories across Argentina declared bankruptcy and the workers then commandeered the factories with the support of the community at large.  The media itself was influenced by such popular participation when a media collective made of unemployed workers formed Piquetero Television for the purpose of getting their message directly to the community at large without the influence of the commercial media.  Thus we see how popular participation tied to the economic struggles is transforming Argentina’s representative democracy into a participatory democracy where the will of the people is truly sovereign over all aspects of society.  Journalist Al Giordano coined the term “Authentic Democracy” for such a participatory system.  Should the Argentine people be able to complete the transformation of their society into a participatory system where the masses hold power within Argentine society then December of 2001 may later be known as the birth of “Authentic Democracy” in Argentina.

    The aftermath of the upheaval in December 2001 saw five different presidents in ten days before the Peronist former governor of Buenos Aires, Eduardo Duhalde, was selected by Congress to serve out the remainder of De la Rua’s term.  Duhalde faced a difficult situation as President since he had face the pressure from the IMP demanding payment on the loans and the mass of protestors demanding greater social spending.  The dire fiscal situation of Argentina led to over 11,000 instances of popular protests throughout the country in the five months following De la Rua’s ouster.(4)   The Duhalde government’s response to the massive political protest was to give handouts to poor families with unemployed heads of households.  This handout, begun in May 2002, amounted to less than $50 U.S. dollars a month per family and did little to blunt the popular protests.(5)  

       Furthermore, popular assemblies, or neighborhood meetings of sorts, take on local concerns and problems often at the expense of the national government.  One such assembly advocated not paying property taxes and instead turning the money over to local hospitals in desperate need of medical supplies.(6)   This idea of spending money originally destined for the government on community needs reflects the widely held perception of governmental corruption and subservience to foreign creditors, which was reflected in the popular shout ‘no more foreign loans.’(7)   As one such assembly organizer related “new loans only mean more swindling and robbery by our government officials.”(8)   This view of widespread governmental corruption caused many grassroots organizations, especially the piqueteros, to have an open and public dialogue when negotiating with government officials. (9)  This open dialogue while negotiating with the governments ensures that the leaders of such grassroots movements will not compromise the movement by accepting bribes or jobs in exchange for selling out the rank and file members of such grassroots organizations, as had been the case for so many other social movements in Argentina.

       The challenges facing the Duhalde government were so great that the President called for early elections in March 2003, nine months early, to decide his successor.  The four main candidates for president included three Peronist candidates.  This fact demonstrated the fracturing of the Peronist Party.  Thus the economic crisis and the resulting popular protest forced a major shift in Argentine politics since in 2003 for the first time the Peronist party would not be unified behind one candidate for president.(10)   The other major candidate, Elisa Carrio, represented the emergence of a working class political movement, the Alternative for a Republic of Equals (ARI), which was formed only eighteen months prior to the election.  However, despite being an early favorite, Argentina’s two socialist parties split from Carrio’s ARI and chose to run their own candidates thus forcing the newly formed ARI into a confrontation against the massive Peronist organization.(11)   The three main Peronist candidates were Nestor Kirchner, Rodriguez Saa, and Carlos Menem.  Kirchner and Saa ran on watered down popular platforms similar to Carrio’s but Menem’s platform represented a grave threat to the progressive future for Argentina.   Menem’s platform threatened the popular organizations that recently arrived on the political scene in Argentina with a ‘mano duro’ (tough hand) security program, which could include using the army to squelch popular protest, strengthening the ‘carnal relations’ to the U.S. in economic matters, and endangering the agreement between Brazil and Argentina to strengthen Mercosur, the South American economic union, due to Menem’s personal animosity for Lula.(12)   However, the hatred for Menem in Argentina was such that once he failed to win the election outright he chose to withdraw rather than face a humiliating defeat at the hands of Kirchner in the runoff election.  Thus Nestor Kirchner became president of Argentina.

      Although Kirchner ran as a populist his policies are best described as pragmatic.  The pragmatism in Kirchner’s domestic leadership was in how he dealt in social policy.  His social policy involved diminishing the strength of the piquetero movement, rooting out governmental corruption, and accepting drug policy reform.

      The effort to diminish the strength of the piqueteros began before Kirchner came to power.  The piqueteros main form of action against the government when making demands was to set up roadblocks.  This action paralyzed the already struggling economy and the government acted promptly to marginalize and suppress those blockading roads.(13)   This campaign of repression involved using force to break roadblocks and other forms of protest as well as characterizing the most militant piqueteros as ‘violent who don’t want democracy.”(15)   Under Kirchner the process of weakening the piqueteros has continued by pursuing criminal charges against the organizations that blockade roads and government buildings.(15)   Kirchner has also used other methods of dividing the piqueteros, mainly by quietly giving “certain organizations subsidies” as a way of dividing and co-opting piqueteros.(16)  

      Also a new economic tactic was employed to further weaken the piqueteros.  During Nov. of 2003 the city of Neuquén was chosen as the first city to implement a new way of disbursing the unemployment subsidies on magnetic cards.(17)   The piqueteros responded by protesting the move because the card forced those receiving benefits to make purchases from store, which had machines capable of reading the cards, which would take business away from local shops.  Thus further impoverishing the poorer neighborhoods in Neuquén.  The government response was repression using tear gas, water cannons, police dogs, and even live bullets.(18)   These efforts to weaken the piqueteros were meant to restore a measure of stability to Argentine society.  Although they may give Kirchner the breathing space to deal with institutions such as the IMF and corruption within his own government, if he fails to deal with the realities of unemployment and hunger that drive these movements then stability will not come to Argentina.

      Kirchner’s anti corruption effort began when he forced out more than two-thirds of the country’s senior military officers.(19)   This move was widely viewed as a purge of human rights violators within the military.  Kirchner also forced out four directors of Argentina’s National Bank who were known for political patronage.(20)   A more difficult fight was his effort to reform the Supreme Court, which was stacked Menem appointees.  He attempted to clear the court by calling on Congress to begin impeachment proceeding against the most corrupt of Menem’s appointees.(21)   Despite the arduous nature of cleaning up the Supreme Court the most difficult anti-corruption effort was cleaning up the police in the province of Buenos Aires.

      Kirchner’s effort to reform the police involved rooting out corruption within the Buenos Aires provincial police force.  This drive against police corruption began as an effort to fight a recent rash of kidnappings, as the police are widely suspected of involvement in the abductions.(22)   The middle class cacerolazos contributed to this crack down by protesting the crime wave that was taking place.(23)   This recent effort already has resulted with the firing of the head of the Anti-Kidnapping unit of the Buenos Aires provincial police, who ostensibly earned less than $1000 a month yet lived a lavish lifestyle.  Also, Kirchner replaced 10 of the 12 most senior officials in the federal police.(24)   However, this effort met serious resistance, especially since much of the police corruption has benefited the Peronist party and as such, it served to weaken Kirchner’s rivals within Buenos Aires.(25)   Despite the political subterfuge surrounding the corruption probe this effort is absolutely critical to reform Argentine society because if this effort is successful it will not only make for a better police force, it will also serve to make for a better political system.

      The other prong of social reform under Kirchner came in the effort to reform drug policy.  This effort began shortly after Kirchner took power when he nominated Eugenio Zaffaroni, a noted advocate for more humane drug policies, to the Argentine Supreme Court.(26)   Despite being ‘the first judge in Argentina to declare punishment for possession of drugs to be unconstitutional’ Kirchner still nominated Zaffaroni due to his incorruptibility and honesty, which more than likely is why he advocates drug law reform.(27)   Also, the nomination of Zaffaroni assists Kirchner’s effort to purge the Supreme Court of corruption.  This nomination demonstrated two aspects of Kirchner’s administration.  First, it showed progress in his effort to clean up the Supreme Court by nominating a man of unquestioned integrity.  Second, it showed a willingness to break with the failed drug policies imposed upon Latin America by the U.S.  

      Another indication of Kirchner’s willingness to buck the U.S. in drug policy came in August of 2003 when he participated in a ceremony involving coca in the province of Jujuy.(28)   This incident demonstrated Kirchner’s acceptance of the traditional uses of coca in Argentina and it showed he would not be willing to follow the U.S. dictate that there are no legitimate uses for coca.  The most notable development in Argentine drug policy was the proposal of the ‘Parentella Law’, a law legalizing medicinal marijuana, proposed by Buenos Aires representative Irma Parentella of the ARI party.(29)   This law was proposed with the backing of the Harm Reduction Association of Argentina (ARDA, in Spanish initials), a grassroots organization of health care professionals dedicated to changing public policies based on ‘abstinence’ and prohibition of drugs.(30)   This law, being the first proposal of medicinal marijuana legalization in Latin America, demonstrated how a grassroots organization in conjunction with a political climate receptive to change could reform criminal law to benefit society as opposed to appeasing the demands of the U.S. government.

      Although the social reforms in Argentina have been in some cases reactionary and in some cases progressive the international relations have been quite progressive.  The two main issues that Kirchner has been trying to accomplish on the international front are the revival of the Mercosur common market between Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  The second issue Kirchner is attempting to resolve is the repayment of bonds to foreign investors.  

      The process of reviving Mercosur began under Duhalde, when in January of 2003 he met with Lula da Silva of Brazil in a summit to coordinate social policies and more importantly revive the Mercosur customs union.(31)   The revival of Mercosur was so important because of the goal of “a common currency and a common Parliament” for the nations involved that Duhalde set for the restored union.(32)   Kirchner continued the process of reviving Mercosur on June 18th in a meeting with the members of Mercosur and the invited guest Venezuela.  At this meeting Kirchner explained the reasoning behind Mercosur since Argentina’s  ‘future lies in the political integration of Latin America.’(33)   At this same meeting Kirchner laid out ‘automatic alignment with the U.S.A.’ as the alternative to union with the other nations of Latin America.(34)   This development upset U.S. trade negotiators who, for obvious reasons, prefer to negotiate with Latin American nations one at a time instead of a unified bloc.  The wariness of U.S. intentions expressed during the Mercosur meeting came to a head in the Monterrey Summit of the Americas in January of 2004, where Bush’s attempt to place trade talks on the Agenda for the summit was rebuffed by the Latin American countries.(35)   Thus Argentina and much of Latin America view Mercosur as the vehicle to develop Latin America for the benefit of Latin Americans instead of the U.S. corporations.  Also most Latin American leaders see a Mercosur union as a way to buck the U.S. imposed hegemony in Latin America.

      The other aspect of international relationships that has changed drastically since the turmoil of December 2001 is Argentina’s relationship to the IMF.  Argentina’s dealings with the IMF came to a halt during the economic crisis of 2001 when she was forced to default on $130 billion in debt.(36)   The scope of interactions with the IMF and Duhalde was limited to the negotiation of a ‘transitional deal’ with the institution by which $6 billion in debt was rolled over without the accompanying “austerity measures”.(37)   The purpose of the deal was to pave the way for more comprehensive negotiations with Kirchner.  The primary negotiations for Kirchner have been with the bondholders of the debt accrued under Menem and the IMF because for Argentina to receive more loans from the IMF he must engage in “timely, constructive, open negotiations with its creditors”.(38)   Kirchner has not wavered from his initial offer of twenty-five cents on the dollar to the bondholders arguing the high rates of returns on the bonds meant that there was serious risk involved and that the bondholders ought to pay the price for their speculative investment.(39)   The bondholders found the offer unacceptable, but the IMF found the offer satisfactory and released $353 million in funding to Argentina.(40)   The reasoning behind Kirchner’s hard line stance and the IMF apparent cave in is somewhat complicated.  Kirchner feels he has the upper hand in negotiations because the lack of foreign capital in Argentina means the threat of withholding loans and investment to Argentina does not have the same weight as it did in 2001, and widespread popular support for Kirchner’s hard line stance means there is little political risk in his approach.(41)   The IMF accepted Argentina’s argument with the bondholders for two reasons.  First, if Argentina defaults on its debt again it will further erode the IMF’s already shaky credibility.  Second, the IMF cannot afford to let Argentina default because fully fifteen percent of the debt owed to the IMF is from Argentina.(42)   Despite Kirchner’s current victory in negotiations with the IMF and Argentina’s creditors, the victory is only temporary.  The creditors still remain and they must be dealt with or else economic turmoil could easily return to Argentina.

      The foreign debt situation led to the crisis and the crisis caused a profound change in Argentina’s manufacturing sector.   The economic crash of December 2001forced the owners of many Argentine factories to either abandon their factories or declare bankruptcy.  The workers at these factories responded by expropriating the factories and running the facilities themselves.  Two factories in particular are representative of the more than 200 factories that have been ‘recuperated’ by the workers.(43)   The factories, the Brukman textile factory and the Zanón Ceramics Factory, demonstrate the challenges the workers faced in claiming the factories and the success they enjoyed by working with their communities to keep the factories and operating them for the benefit of their respective communities.  Also it must be noted that although these 200 reclaimed factories employ fewer than 20,000 workers the benefits such industries bring to their communities and the examples they set in a new way of doing business makes the impact of these institutions far greater than their numbers would suggest.

      The situation of the Buenos Aires based Brukman factory demonstrates what determined workers can accomplish with the support of their community and sympathizers.  The Brukman textile factory saw its nominal owners abandon the factory in December of 2001.  In their absence the workers resumed production on their own on the 18th of December 2001 as a cooperative. The workers then by trial and error established committees to take the place of the administrators and managers, who left with the owners.  As these committees gained experience they paid off many of the debts incurred under previous ownership and restored the business to profitability.(44)   Once the workers showed the factory could again be productive the previous owners attempted to evict the workers from the factory by having over 300 police officers prevent the workers from entering the factory on April 18th 2003.(45)   Immediately after the eviction the sympathizers of the Brukman workers were notified of what occurred and soon crowds of “workers from other factories, neighborhood assemblies, student organizations, and left-wing political parties” arrived to confront the police.(46)   This crowd faced police repression for three days refusing to leave until the police left and the workers were allowed to return to their factory.(47)   Thus began a tense stand off with the police while the workers navigated the legal system to legally claim the factory with the help of the National Movement of Recuperated Factories (MFNR).(48)   Then after eight months of struggle the Brukman workers with the assistance of their MFNR allies succeeded in persuading the city government of Buenos Aires to expropriate the factory and turn that facility over to the workers in a ‘gratuitous bailment’ where the workers will use and maintain the installations without fee.(49)   The case of the Brukman factory demonstrated the extent to which the upper classes in Argentina held influence, and that a community acting in solidarity could legally counter that influence for the betterment of the impoverished in that community and Argentine society as a whole.

      While the Brukman factory epitomized the class conflict that accompanied expropriation of factories, the Zanón Ceramics Factory, in Neuquén, demonstrated how a worker run factory could contribute to the community.  Unlike the Brukman factory, Zanón was expropriated in October of 2001, prior to the economic crisis of December of 2001.  Technically what the Zanón workers did was illegal and an outstanding order to evict the workers is in place, but the order will not be enforced because many of the influential organizations in the community such as the teacher’s and petroleum workers’ unions as well as the Catholic Church have threatened a general strike if the police attempt to execute the order.(50)   Considering what happened when the government attempted to evict the Brukman workers, should the government take action against the Zanón factory then the likelihood of the community carrying out its threatened general strike would be quite high.  Using the same management and administration by committee approach as the Brukman workers the Zanón workers began the process of restarting production and managed to resume production on March 2, 2002.(51)   Although the production levels were low initially within a year the factory was producing fifty percent more than before the takeover because the workers implemented their ideas for improving production and they brought in technical assistance from the local university.(52)   The bonds between the community and the factory workers are such that they have mutually beneficial arrangements to provide each other with products and services.  This community relationship was seen when the factory workers donated tiles to local community centers and hospitals in exchange the nurses union donates a nurse to each work shift to ensure the health of the workers.  Also the workers used their political influence and organization to support local native peoples, who then donate clay from their lands to the factory.(53)   The Zanón workers demonstrated this political activism during the protests following the decision to disburse unemployment benefits via magnetic strip cards when many of the workers took part in the protests in solidarity with the piqueteros.(54)   Thus the Zanón Ceramics Factory made itself an integral part of the local community by benefiting as well as supporting the community and in turn received benefits from the community.  This type of business relationship holds enormous potential and as such it is dangerous to the established ways of doing business.

      Due to the threat the piqueteros and the reclaimed factories pose to the established ownership classes they have not been fairly portrayed in Argentina’s commercial press.  The response by the piqueteros was to establish their own forms of media and mass communication, notably Grupo Alavío a media collective that acts as publicity generator for the piqueteros.(55)   The establishment of Grupo Alavío was to ‘combat corporate media’s censorship and misinformation.’(56)   The most impressive project resulting from this media effort was a television station dedicated to the unemployed workers called TV-piquetera. The formation of TV-piquetera came about from collaboration between Grupo Alavío and Popular Unity Movement-December 20 (MUP-20) a piquetero organization based in Buenos Aires.  TV-piquetera broadcast programming that related to issues that the majority of Argentines could relate to and those that cast piqueteros in a positive light not as “criminals or corrupt freeloaders”(57).   Also, the producers of TV-piquetera arranged to interview those viewing the channel to gain feedback about the piquetero organizations and integrate potential supporters into the piquetero movement.  Thus TV-piquetera acts to improve piquetero movement by bringing more activists into the organizations, fostering debate within the organizations, and promoting a sense of class solidarity among the unemployed of Argentina.(58)  Although other forms of media, especially print media, are valuable for disseminating the piqueteros’ message they have not demonstrated the same ability to generate feedback and a sense of class solidarity as TV-piquetera.(59)  Due to TV-piquetera’s ability to reach the masses of Argentina’s unemployed and draw them into the struggle for social change it holds the most promise for fostering real meaningful change in Argentina.(60)

      The previous two years in Argentine history have seen drastic change in the political, social, international, and economic realm.  The main catalyst for the change has been the organizing of unemployed and working class into piquetero groups.  Juan Peron organized the working class and unemployed in the 1940’s and 50’s.  However, what differentiated the piqueteros from the descamisados of the 40’s and 50’s was that the piqueteros were largely grassroots organizations of unemployed or workers dedicated to improving life for the poor and working  class while the Peronist party organized the descamisados for political gain.  The piquetero movement threatens the established power wherever it attempted to reform Argentine society for its benefit, therefore it faced opposition in its efforts.  

      Politically, the piqueteros made their greatest impact in December of 2001 when they were joined by the cacerolazos in protesting the government at the time. Together they succeeded in forcing out five different presidents in the span of less than two weeks.  Once the initial furor died down the cacerolazos generally did not protest publicly except to demand certain actions from the government such as a crack down on criminals.  The piqueteros on the other hand continued their protests for jobs and social programs.  The government response was to crackdown on such protests as to gain time to deal with other pressing problems and preserve order.  This popular participation by the piqueteros and the governmental repression encapsulates the class conflict currently underway in Argentina.  Although the class conflict is not the only issue facing Argentina now it is the most important because it has ties to many major developments in Argentine society.

      The anti corruption efforts marked a possible break from Argentina’s traditional patronage system. Although Kirchner may just be purging supporters of his rivals as to place his own supporters in key positions.  Also the drug policy reform served to assist his anti-corruption efforts as it enabled him to nominate a man of integrity to the Supreme Court.  Internationally the drug policy reform showed he was willing to buck the U.S. imposed prohibitionist dogma when it came to drugs.  

      Changes in international relations after the crisis involved dealing with foreign creditors and the IMF.  Also international relations called for a strengthening of the Mercosur union to provide a common trading bloc in South America to rival the U.S.

      Economic change was an area where there tended to be more government repression than assistance since this was the development that most threatened the elites because it struck at the economic advantage enjoyed by the rich.  The workers taking over abandoned factories and making them profitable upset the owners who often abandoned the factories in the first place.  When the owners sought to reclaim the factories, the government often assisted the owners, but the combined forces of the owners and government could not defeat a worker’s cooperative that had widespread community support.  These economic gains by the piqueteros are the most important since it gives them an economic model to emulate for the rest of the country as well and economic foundation to carry on the struggle for greater equality between rich and poor.  Also the development of community media enabled the piqueteros to spread their message in the face of the commercial media’s distortions about them.

      These are some of the major changes Argentina has undergone since December of 2001.  Though significant these changes are not permanent and many of them, especially the workers’ cooperatives, may be reversed in near future if the communities fails to defend what they have gained.  Should the concrete gains of the piqueteros be successfully defended from their enemies then there will be a real possibility that Argentina will undergo substantial and meaningful change that will set an example for the rest of the world on how society can develop in ways other than economically.
1. David Rock, Argentina the Collapse of the Neoliberal Economic Model
2. Andrés Gaudin, Thirteen Days That Shook Argentina- And Now What? NACLA Mar.-Apr. 2002
3. Ibid
4. Roger Burbach, “Throw Them All Out” Argentina’s Grassroots Rebellion NACLA July- August 2002
5. David Rock, Argentina the Collapse of the Neoliberal Economic Model
6. Roger Burbach, “Throw Them All Out” Argentina’s Grassroots Rebellion NACLA July- August 2002
7. Roger Burbach, “Throw Them All Out” Argentina’s Grassroots Rebellion NACLA July- August 2002
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Reed Lindsay, Argentina: The Specter of Menem, Jan. 20 2003 www.narconews.com
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Maria Trigona, Continuing Police Repression in Argentina, April 10, 2003 http://www.zmag.org
14. Ibid
15. Marie Trigona, Repression of Piqueteros in Argentina, Oct. 29, 2003 http://www.zmag.org
16. Ibid
17. Jennifer Schockemoehl and Jennifer Lawhorne, Repression of Argentine Workers, Dec. 26,2003 http://www.zmag.org
27. Ibid
28. Teo Ballve, Argentina: Kirchner Shakes Things Up, NACLA July-August 2003
29. Ibid
30. Ibid
31. Larry Rohter, Argentine Moves Against Police Corruption, Nov. 17, 2003, The New York Times
32. Ibid
33. Teo Ballve, Argentina: Kirchner Shakes Things Up, NACLA July-August 2003
34. Larry Rohter, Argentine Moves Against Police Corruption, Nov. 17, 2003, The New York Times
35. Luis Gómez, Drug Policy Reformer Nominated to Supreme Court in Argentina, July 2, 2003 http://www.narconews.com
36. Ibid
37. Luis Gómez, Argentina’s Encouraging Panorama in Drug Policy, Aug. 5 2003, http://www.narconews.com
38. Luis Gómez, Argentina: Decriminalizing Medicinal Marijuana, Aug. 27, 2003 http://www.narconews.com
39. Luis Gómez, Reducing the Risks, Aug. 15, 2003, http://www.narconews.com
40. Reed Lindsay, Argentina: The Specter of Menem, Jan. 20 2003 http://www.narconews.com
41. Ibid
42. Fred Rosen, Mercosur’s Hope, NACLA July-August 2003
43. Ibid
44. Roland Flamini, Analysis: No Friendly Get Together, Jan. 12, 2004, UPI
45. David Rock, Argentina the Collapse of the Neoliberal Economic Model
46. Teo Ballvé, Argentina: Transitional Deal With IMF, NACLA January/February 2003
47. Mary O’Grady, Argentina Tells Bondholders Take It or Leave It, Jan. 30 2004, The Wall Street Journal
48. Roger Burbach, Argentina Fights Back, Feb. 22, 2004, http://www.counterpunch.com
49. Mary O’Grady, Argentina Tells Bondholders Take It or Leave It, Jan. 30 2004, The Wall Street Journal
50. Reed Lindsay, Argentina Battling IMF Over Collapse, March 13, 2004, The South Florida Sun Sentinel
51. Ibid
52. Carolyn Sattin, Aregentina: Mobilized Citizens Reject factory Eviction, NACLA May-June 2003
53. Pablo Waisberg, Argentine Workers Take Over Factories, Nov. 28, 2002, Latin America News Service
54. Carolyn Sattin, Argentina: Mobilized Citizens Reject factory Eviction, NACLA May-June 2003
55. Ibid
56. Marie Trigona, Brukman Workers Continue to Fight for Factory, June 9, 2003, http://www.zmag.org
57. Vivana Alonso, Workers Salvage Factories and Jobs, Jan. 2, 2004, Interpress Service
58. Ginger Gentile, Argentine Lessons, March 8, 2004, http://www.zmag.org
59. Marie Trigona, Repression of Piqueteros in Argentina, Oct. 29, 2003 http://www.zmag.org
60. Marie Trigona, The Making of Piquetero Television, NACLA January-February 2004