DHS: The federal government should lead by example and not by corruption

As an introduction, I am using the last Executive Order issued on June 9, 2008 by U.S. President George W. Bush regarding the immigration E-Verify system. Alarmed with the recent publications about how the current Bush administration mislead and lie to the U.S. Congress and to the American People to link Iraq with September 11, 2001, to engage the United States in wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security DHS), I decided to review the literature and write about what I considered the waste and misuse of billions of dollars of tax-payers monies on the alleged war against terrorism and “dangerous people” by DHS and its immigration and customs agencies.

It is my hope that with a new elected U.S. president and a new administration in 2009, and a serious assessment of both, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Republicans, DHS will be eliminated and some or all of the agencies operating under the very poor leadership of DHS, would be returned to their original place under their respective departments. It is my hope also that the Legacy U.S. Customs Service and the Legacy U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service will be split and also returned to their former status. The Bush administration use misleading and false information to create a new and very dysfunctional mogul department, DHS. We have seen how billions of dollars have been wasted, and misused in the name of our national security by DHS and its agencies, especially ICE. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff keep saying that Americans live now safer than prior to 9/11. We may be living safer, but we, the American tax-payer are paying a price. We have basically given up several of our U.S. Constitutional Rights, and live basically like “prisoners” in our homes for fear that if we go out on the streets we may be stopped by the police or immigration officials if we look “foreign” for no reason at all other than “driving while looking like a foreigner” (a typically racial profile police traffic stop).

If we live near the U.S. and Mexican border and want to go to Mexico, shopping or just to get something to eat, we must expect an average of a two-hour waiting period (by vehicle), trying to get back. If we decide to walk, sometimes the waiting time is the same, because the Customs & Border Protection Inspectors are required to query all names in their data bases. Recently, I crossed the Andrade, CA border with my 15-year old son. We both had the required DHS personal identification of being U.S. citizens. His name was also queried. Some U.S. senior citizens who looked like they were in their 70s or 80s were subjected to the same criteria. What I learned with my research is that all of the DHS’ employees working at land, sea, and airports have no discretion at all (with the exception of course if the inspector is a corrupt employee) when conducting inspections and examinations for admission into the USA or when driving through a U.S. Border Patrol check-point. The worst scenario is if you happen to have a similar name of a suspected terrorist listed in the infamous “terrorist watch list” which contains thousands and thousands of names. Further, if you are a native of a particular country that DHS and the U.S. State Department listed in the “Special Country List,” whether you have been a naturalized citizen of the United States for 20, or 30 years and you have never returned to your country of origin, you still will be subjected to a more extensive and complete examination before you can be released from “custody” – all in the name of protecting our National Security.

Fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority are being conducted by DHS, ICE, and CBP management and supervisors. Take for example the letter written by ICE Deputy Special Agent in Charge Kyle “Bully” Barnette, posted in my other Narco News stories, whereby he admitted using his “on-the-job” the agency’s Internet to engage in a “website bullying” with anonymous ICE employees and making threats. Further he touched in a very sensitive subject: the misuse of government-owned vehicles (GOV) and tax-payers monies to buy gasoline. Kyle “Bully” Barnette asserted that living in distant places from their offices and driving GOVs was at the discretion of the field ICE’s special agent in charge.

During my employment with the Legacy U.S. Customs Service’s Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) (1995-1999), management allowed special agents to live as far as 120 miles away from their place of employment. As the Resident Agent in Charge for a Customs’ OIA, I objected to that ruled, especially when my duty agent was living almost in San Diego, CA (Pine Valley, CA) and the location of the port was at the Andrade, CA port of entry. We had an employee who lived that far, 123 miles one way. Further, the majority of my staff, including myself, was allowed to live in Yuma, AZ.

On a daily basis, we would drive 60 -70 miles one-way to the office. Now, if DHS, ICE, and CBP have the same policy, at our current gasoline prices, which are escalating by the week, the above agencies are over-spending and misusing their Congressional allocated fund. Another question, why ICE field managers who only drive from their homes to their offices have a need of driving new large luxury cars, when their jobs are merely desk-jobs and have no need to do any field investigative work?

On February 8, 2008, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff issued a press release regarding the DHS’ 2009 budget, whereby he used the following statement:

“The Department of Homeland Security’s main priority is to prevent terrorist attacks against the nation and to protect our nation from dangerous people. DHS will continue to prevent the entry of terrorists while facilitating the legitimate flow of people by strengthening border security efforts and continuing to gain effective control of America’s borders.” – DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff - http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1202151112290.shtm

I, denounce and rebuke DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff for asserting that all illegal aliens attempting to enter, or who are already in the United States may be considered “terrorists” and factually considered them “dangerous people.” I consider Chertoff’s remarks to be misleading and racist. Such statement from a Bush’s cabinet member only induces more hatred towards anyone who looks like a native of a foreign country. It creates and induces already prone White Supremacist groups to commit more hate crimes against defenseless minority people from ethnic backgrounds regardless of their U.S. citizenship or immigration status.

In 2007, the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Service (USCIS) increased their immigration fees 80 percent. If a citizen from another country wants to come to visit the United States, or to apply for an immigration benefit from abroad, he or she must file the required immigration forms at their nearest U.S. Embassy or U.S. Consular office. However, the fee applies for both immigrants who are already in the U.S. or people living abroad. I wonder if there has been a decline in our legitimate tourists from abroad who used to come to the USA and spend their monies and help our economy. With all of the “red-tape” and “over-kill” immigration and customs examinations at our land, air and sea borders, I doubt very much our tourist industry is contributing to our U.S. government tax coffers.

Our immigrants already in the United States who have legitimate immigration benefits due to their family relationship with a U.S. citizen, or an asylum applicant who have already obtained the status of a legal permanent residents, still have to wait to get their I-551 cards – showing that they are lawful alien permanent residents. The problem is that due to understaffing, poor resources, etc., the USCIS take months or years before issuing these I-551 cards.

Why did I use the title “The federal government should lead by example and not by extortion” – it is because if an approved lawful resident alien wants to work in a given profession, they have to "pay" to the federal government (DHS) in order to have the right to work. Granted, I know that if an alien is applying for an immigration benefit, he or she must pay a reasonable fee. However, DHS is misusing its authority in over-charging not only for immigration benefit fees, but fees required at seaports and airports which affect not only to our immigrant population but to our general U.S. citizenry population. Take for example a real case: an asylum applicant who obtained twice employment authorization cards. The first one was free and the second one cost her $180.00. In the process, she married a U.S. Citizen (USC) who applied for her lawful alien permanent resident. The application, I-130 form and the application for adjustment of status were submitted and processed. In the meantime, she applied for a renewal of her employment authorization card and paid the $180 fee. The USCIS requested a copy of a “parole release form.” She wrote that she had never been arrested before any U.S. immigration agency or police and that she did not have such a form. Her application was denied without any rights for an appeal, and the USCIS as a “policy” did not refund her the $180. Yet she was still a documented asylum applicant, except this time she was not able to drive because she needed her new employment authorization card (EAC) from USCIS in order to renew her operator’s driver license. Further, she could not work because her EAC had expired.

The above alien and her USC were interviewed twice by a USCIS adjudication examiner for the I-130 application, and later again for the adjustment of status application. Upon the conclusion of the second interview, the USCIS adjudication officer granted her an “oral” approval of her I-551 – Lawful Alien Permanent Resident and told her that she was legally to work and to freely travel anywhere in the United States. However, the USCIS officer refused to stamp her passport as “I-551 approved” and gave her no proof that she was in fact a legal resident. She had no proof that she was legally in the USA. In summary, she waited another year, secluded in her home when she again applied for another EAC. This time she paid $320. However, the USCIS once again denied her application because she used the wrong immigration statute code. The USCIS again kept the $320 and told her that she had no appeal rights.

Another year went by and finally, the I-551 card, good for ten years arrived in the mail. She was happy but financially broke due to the USCIS failure to process her I-551 in a timely manner. It took two years for the USCIS to process her card. Her case is not an isolated one. There are thousands of similar cases in the USA. I remember that before DHS was created, applicants who received oral approvals of their I-551 had their passport stamped with the letters “I-551 Approved” with the date and signature of the immigration officer. I assume that you only get this “extra service” if you pay an additional fee of over $1,000 to expedite the process. In my opinion, the federal government is running a “racket” and “extortion” with their “odd” immigration policies. My guess is that the Bush administration has found a “gold mine” with the immigration situation in order to generate additional funds for the other expenditures by ICE and CBP, and to financially support his war on Iraq and Afghanistan.

On Monday June 9, 2008, president George W. Bush in a surprised blow to thousands of immigrants who are waiting months or years to receive their I-155, Lawful Permanent Resident Card, has issued an Executive Order making mandatory for all companies doing business with the federal government to begin ensuring their employees can legally work in the U.S. Now, such companies must use the E-Verify to check worker’s Social Security numbers.

However, the new anti-illegal aliens initiative would force more businesses to use E-Verify, the Employment Eligibility Verification Program that critics say is flawed because it doesn't detect identify theft. Thus, it is predicted that criminal organization syndicates will find in the E-Verify a lucrative business of engaging in identity theft. Identity theft will rise like a rocket.

On April 10, 2008, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff issued the following prepared Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations. Chertoff testified that DHS needed funding for the “E-Verify: Total funding of $100 million is requested for E-Verify. This U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) program allows employers to use an automated system to verify name, date of birth, and Social Security Number, along with immigration information for non-citizens, against federal databases to confirm the employment eligibility of both citizen and non-citizen new hires. USCIS will deploy additional staff covering information status verification, compliance, and monitoring. It is important that Congress reauthorize the program so that these employers can continue to benefit from E-Verify and not have to play detective when hiring new employees.”

Chertoff testified also that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement “fined or seized more than $30 million following worksite investigations” and “seized roughly $2.5 million in cash” in drug related enforcement operations. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1207933887848.shtm

What's Wrong With the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement?

I wanted to stop writing about the infamous U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement’s management and supervisory officials who are part of the “good-old boy and girl network” but new developed information compels me to keep writing until these “miserable creatures” (as Bob Dole called Scott McClellan) are brought to justice.

My understanding is that Kyle “Bully” Barnette had officially retired from his high-ranking management position as the Deputy Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the ICE-SAC Office, New Orleans, LA.  I don’t know the reason (s) of his early retirment.  However, in my previous stories I reported information that Bully Barnette had been misusing his Internet and working hours engaging in cyber bulling practices.

Now it has brought to my attention, that Kyle “Bully” Barnette has been rehired by the ICE’s boss, Julie Myers and her underling Susan E. Lane, whom I personally know when she was a working special agent (GS-1811-12) with the Legacy U.S. Customs Service’s Office of Investigations, El Centro, CA.  One thing always amazed me that when she used to take the Customs’ sponsored Spanish test given to all agents applying for extra pay for being bilingual, she always scored a perfect 4 score, while those of us who grew-up in the”barrio” and knew how to speak the real Mexican-Spanish street language of the US-Mexican border, always scored 2 or 3.  The higher your score was the more money you got.  As a Resident Agent in Charge for the Office of Internal Affairs, GS-1811-14, El Centro, CA, I received complaints about the fact that even when she scored top on her Spanish test, she often asked other local Mexican Spanish speaking agents or inspectors to help her conduct interviews of suspected drug smugglers at the Calexico, CA port of entry because apparently she did not understand "their Spanish."   Unfortunately, I was not able to do anything because it was out of our internal affairs' priorities.  Susan E. Lane’s Spanish skills and getting compensated for speaking a perfect “Spanish” was a management problem.

Now, returning to our principal player, Kyle “Bully” Barnette’s new address and location as reported by an anonymous source is:

Kyle E. Barnette
DHS/ICE/Office of Intelligence
Director, Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC)
Bldg. 2040, Stennis Space Center, MS 39529
228-688-3205 (Direct Line) 228-688-3501 (Direct FAX)
504-915-2709 (Cell)
Kyle.Barnette@DHS.GOV (Email)

My guess is that Bully Barnette contacted his buddy Miguel Unzueta, the ICE, SAC (SES) San Diego, CA, and Susan E. Lane to obtain his new top management position.  More evidence of cronyism and favoritism at ICE.

As to Susan E. Lane, I personally question her managerial leadership, considering that in 2005 she was only working as a GS-1811-12 special agent in El Centro, CA, and now she is a Senior Executive Service (SES).

The most shocking and interesting revelation is that ICE’s boss Julie Myers allowed Susan E. lane to post her picture in the official ICE’s website and state that “Ms. Lane began her career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1983 to 1993.” (Emphasis mine)  I wonder how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) feels about exposing the identity of one of its operative officers true identity, to include her picture.  Wonder how many CIA cases have been compromised for a breach of our national intelligence security?  I also wonder how all of her “assets” (confidential informants) and the bad guys feel knowing that the person they knew from 1983 to 1993 was in fact a CIA’s Operations Officer.  This is of course, if Susan L. lane ever worked undercover overseas, or if she was just assigned to a desk at the CIA’s HQ.

Reference:

ICE's Director, Office of Intelligence Susan E. Lane

"Susan E. Lane is the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Intelligence. As director, Ms. Lane manages intelligence functions within ICE and its field operations including programmatic oversight, budget, policy and security. This includes seeing that intelligence is developed or received, analyzed and disseminated to ICE executive management and operational units.

A 24 year veteran in the intelligence field, with the last 12 with ICE or one of its predecessor organizations, she had been acting assistant director since the beginning of 2007. Prior to that assignment, Ms. Lane was the first unit chief for the ICE National Security Integration Center (NSIC), which collocated operational and intelligence personnel to identify actionable national security intelligence. She began her service in ICE headquarters in 2004 as the unit chief for the ICE National Security & Threat Protection (NSTP) Unit. NSTP was responsible for providing oversight and guidance to ICE agents assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the nation.

Earlier in her career she was the first supervisor of the Los Angeles Seaport Investigations group, Group Supervisor for a Financial - Money Laundering Investigations group, spent three years as a senior special agent assigned to the San Diego Financial Task Force and before that as a US Customs special agent assigned to El Centro, California.

Ms. Lane began her career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1983 to 1993.

She holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science from the University of San Diego." http://www.ice.gov/about/leadership/intel_bio/susan_lane.htm

Some Interesting Facts

2009 U.S. Office and Management Budget - Department of Homeland Security
(Dollar amounts in millions)

Spending - Gross Discretionary Budget Authority: (2007 is actual and 2008 and 2009 are estimated)

Customs and Border Protection: 2007: 6,332; 2008: 7,875; 2009: 9,494

Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 2007: 4,446; 2008: 4,817; 2009: 5,364

Citizenship and Immigration Services: 2007: 180; 2008: −4; 2009: 151

Mandatory Outlays:

Citizenship and Immigration Services: 2007: 1,655; 2008: 2,390; 2007: 2,539

Customs and Border Protection: 2007: 1,035; 2008: 2,281; 2009: 1,463 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/homeland.html

“Mandatory spending refers to outlays resulting from budget authority that is provided in laws other than appropriation acts, for example, entitlement programs such as Medicare, Food Stamps, and veterans’ pensions. Mandatory spending—like tax expenditures—is governed by eligibility rules and benefit formulas, which means that funds are spent as required to provide benefits to those who are eligible and wish to participate. Therefore, unforeseen events such as changes in the economy or additional demands for services can translate into unanticipated additional program outlays. Congress controls spending for these programs indirectly by defining eligibility and setting the benefit or payment rules rather than directly through appropriation acts. On an annual basis, however, mandatory spending is relatively uncontrollable since Congress and the President must change substantive law in order to further increase or decrease outlays. This makes it more challenging to constrain costs and to design both triggers and triggered responses.” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06276.pdf

On October 11, 2007, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued report number GAO-08-110, titled “TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List”

What GAO Found

“The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records.

From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats.

Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency’s mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data.

Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped—within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish government-wide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.”

”http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08110.pdf

On June 5, 2008, the DHS’OIG, Richard L. Skinner testified before the JOINT HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Re: The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria. http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_RLS_060508a.pdf

On February 13, 2008, the DHS’OIG, Richard L. Skinner testified before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. In essence, Mr. Skinner testimony stated:

“CIS’ Backlog of Immigrant Applications

A key factor in this effort will be the progress CIS makes in modernizing its information technology systems. CIS has developed a number of plans to modernize its systems, but none of them have been implemented fully. As noted earlier in this testimony, we reported in November 2006 that until USCIS improves IT management and operations, the bureau will not be in a position to either effectively manage existing workloads or handle the potentially dramatic increase in immigration benefits processing workloads that could result from proposed immigration reform legislation.” http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_RLS_021308.pdf

On June 15, 2007, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued report number GAO-07-946R, titled Department of Homeland Security: Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule.

Of significance, GAO wrote: “According to USCIS, if it does not increase its fees, the necessary significant spending reductions will have a negative impact on the agency’s mission. USCIS estimates that the increases in fees from this final rule will provide the agency with an additional $1.081 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. USCIS will use these funds to support its mission. According to USCIS, if it does not increase its fees, the necessary significant spending reductions will have a negative impact on the agency’s mission.” http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d07946r.pdf

In April 2007, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued report number GAO-07-529, titled “CUSTOMS REVENUE: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability”

What GAO Found

“The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collected nearly $30 billion in revenue in fiscal year 2006, making it the second largest revenue generator for the U.S. government. Historically, the U.S. Customs Service was responsible for collecting revenue in the form of customs duties, taxes, and fees. However, these responsibilities were transferred to DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 when the U.S. Customs Service was merged with parts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to form CBP in March 2003.” (GAO Report, Page 1)

“Staff resources contributing to customs revenue functions have generally declined since the creation of DHS, in part due to department priorities focused on homeland security and recruiting and retention problems for some positions. First, the number of staff in designated customs revenue positions was below the mandated level for much of the time since DHS was formed, although recent efforts have increased the number of staff in most of these positions. Second, the total number of support staff associated with customs revenue positions declined, with six of eight positions losing support staff. Lastly, other DHS staff contribute to performing or improving customs revenue functions, but some of their contributions have declined over time.” (GAO Report, Page 3) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07529.pdf

On February 16, 2007, GAO issued report number GAO-07-499T and titled: “HOMELAND SECURITY: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed”

What GAO Found

“After spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at most ports of entry; however, it has not implemented a biometric exit capability or a suitable alternative. As of December 2006, US-VISIT had deployed and was operating entry capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports of entry. However, the implementation of a biometric land exit capability is currently not feasible, according to program officials, because the only proven technology available would require additional staffing and infrastructure demands, and cause delays with potential impacts on trade and commerce. Also, testing and analysis of a non-biometric solution identified numerous performance and reliability problems, and such an alternative technology does not meet legislative requirements. DHS believes that advances over the next 5 to 10 years will allow solutions that do not require major infrastructure changes, but the prospects for such technology are uncertain.

DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties.

• For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT without producing the program’s operational and technological context. According to program officials, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and to define an overall immigration and border management vision. After almost 2 years, this plan has not yet been approved, but the Acting Director said that it is currently with OMB for approval. At the same time, DHS has launched other major security programs without defining the relationship between US-VISIT and these programs.

• DHS has yet to economically justify its investment in US-VISIT increments or assess their operational impacts. For over 3 years, we reported that the program did not adequately assess the increment’s costs and benefits because the assessments were unclear and insufficient, and the cost estimates upon which they were based did not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. GAO further reported that the program had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope of the evaluations performed were too limited.

• DHS has not implemented key acquisition and financial management controls. For example, GAO reported that the program had not effectively overseen contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement effective contract oversight activities.

Without these management controls, there is greater risk that US-VISIT will not produce the right solution, and be managed the right way. Accordingly, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address these management challenges.” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07499t.pdf

In June 2006, the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman sent its annual report to the U.S. Congress. Some of the redacted and noteworthy information is posted below:

“Congress mandates that USCIS be self-funded. (Emphasis Mine) Following the requirement that INS recover full operational costs, the agency requested increases in its fee schedules to recover those costs. Not all fee increase requests were approved, but there was a general recognition that higher fees per application were justified to recover costs incurred for providing non-fee INS services. At the same time, Congress required that INS add a surcharge to certain filing fees to recover the costs of providing services to individuals unable to pay. In later years, the surcharge extended to fund asylum and refugee applications as well as military naturalizations. Simultaneously, case processing backlogs caused alarm. In 2001, the Administration required that INS improve its slow processing time to six months or less for all applications within five years. Congress appropriated $500 million over five years from FY 02 through FY 06 to accomplish that task. However, the underlying objective of achieving faster processing times was undermined by the need for revenue to support the agency. Applications for ancillary services necessitated by the backlogs generated substantial additional revenue estimated to be in excess of $350 million in FY 05, particularly from three sources: (1) EAD applications for green card applicants; (2) advance parole applications; and (3) premium processing for nonimmigrant employment based applicants (Form I-129). USCIS increased the EAD and advance parole application fees beyond the amount needed to recover the actual costs of the service. USCIS has become dependent on revenue derived from these applications, which are required only because of the slow processing of applications for core services. Section II.A provides additional detail on slow green card processing. Similarly, the employment-based green card process has resulted in substantial revenue to the agency and is further discussed at section II.B.

In addition, USCIS incurred other costs, which had to be recovered by fees. For example, in 2003, shared services agreements following the INS breakup required USCIS to perform certain services for ICE and CBP including all records functions for which USCIS was to be reimbursed. In addition, USCIS’ budget incorporated many costs associated with shared services, including information technology, security checks, personnel, and fingerprinting. Moreover, USCIS had to set aside funds for investment purposes or to start-up new programs imposed by Congress without any appropriations.” http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman_AnnualReport_2006_Appendices_III-USCIS_Revenue.pdf

In March 2006, GAO issued report number GAO-06-259, titled: “IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud.”

What GAO Found:

“Although the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available evidence suggests that it is a serious problem. Several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases shed light on aspects of its nature—particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent documents and can be facilitated by white collar and other criminals, with the potential for large profits. USCIS staff denied about 20,000 applications for fraud in fiscal year 2005.

USCIS has established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is performing risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of internal control standards established by GAO and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit organizations—particularly a comprehensive risk management approach, a mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring during the course of normal activities, clear communication regarding how to balance multiple objectives, mechanisms to help ensure that staff have access to key information, and performance goals for fraud prevention.

DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud. Best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which includes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness, is an integral part of fraud control. Because most immigration benefit fraud is not prosecuted criminally, the principal means of sanctioning it would be administrative penalties. Although immigration law gives DHS the authority to levy administrative penalties, the component of DHS that administers them does not consider them to be cost-effective and does not routinely impose them. However, DHS has not evaluated the costs and benefits of sanctions, including the value of potential deterrence. Without a credible sanctions program, DHS’s efforts to deter fraud may be less effective, when applicants perceive little threat of punishment.” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06259.pdf

In November 2005, GAO issued report number GAO-06-20, titled: “IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications.”

What GAO Found:

“By June 2005, USCIS estimated it had reduced its backlog from a peak of 3.8 million cases to about 1.2 million. However, this estimate is not a measure of the number of pending cases older than 6 months—the definition of backlog used by the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000. USCIS’s current data systems cannot provide precise data on the age of all application types. A proposed technology transformation offers an opportunity to develop a case management system with this capability.

USCIS has reduced its backlog mainly by increasing and realigning staff. To prevent future backlogs, USCIS will rely on additional staffing reallocation and technology transformation. However, the technology plan is in the early planning stages, and USCIS has not finalized its estimated cost or identified the gains it could yield.

Despite progress, it is unlikely that USCIS will completely eliminate the backlog by the 2006 deadline. While it met fiscal year 2006 targets for half of the 15 backlogged application types, USCIS may have difficulty eliminating its backlog for two complex application types that constitute nearly three-quarters of the backlog. A backlog may also remain in offices where the volume of cases exceeds adjudicator staff capacity. Other factors, such as lengthy background checks, could also hinder USCIS’s ability to achieve and maintain its backlog elimination goals. USCIS officials noted that its current plan is premised on current legislation and would be affected by proposed legislative changes that could impose additional demands on the agency.

Aside from regular supervisory review, USCIS operates two programs to ensure the quality of its post adjudication decisions, yet neither program provides a systematic and inclusive review of all application types. One program reviews adjudicators’ compliance with standard processes for two application types, and the other evaluates compliance with standard processes and the reasonableness of decisions rendered, but only for selected applications processed in four centers.”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0620.pdf

On September 27, 2004, Prakash Khatri, CIS Ombudsman issued a “RECOMMENDATION FROM THE CIS OMBUDSMAN TO THE DIRECTOR, USCIS Re: Recommend the expansion of the Premium Processing Service (PPS) to include employment-based change-of-status (I-539) applications. In essence, Mr. Khatri recommended the following: “Premium Processing Service (PPS) allows U.S. businesses to pay a $1,000 fee for the 15-calendar day processing of their petitions and applications. USCIS guarantees that within 15 days USCIS will issue either an approval notice, a notice of intent to deny, a request for evidence or a notice of investigation for fraud or misrepresentation. If USCIS fails to process the petition within 15 days, it will refund the $1,000 to the company and continue to process the petition as part of the PPS In addition to receiving expedited processing, companies who participate in the program may use a dedicated phone number and e-mail address to check on the status of or to ask questions about their petitions and applications.” http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman_RR_8_Premium_Processing_09-27-04.pdf

Immigration on the News:

Bush widens immigration checks: Federal contractors must verify workers' legal status, his order says. Millions could eventually be affected. By Nicole Gaouette, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer - June 10, 2008 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/politics/la-na-immig10-2008jun10,0,5479886.story

E-Verify checks worker status, draws criticism - System used by 3,000 Oregon employers now has naturalization data By Thelma Guerrero-Huston • Statesman Journal, June 3, 2008 http://www.statesmanjournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080603/NEWS/806030337/1001

Immigration Application Fees to Rise By 80 Percent - By Spencer S. Hsu and Darryl Fears - Washington Post Staff Writers - Wednesday, January 31, 2007; Page A03

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013001864.html

DHS’ Related Federal Agencies

Additional References can be found in the numerous investigative and audits reports issued, from March 2003 to June 2008 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) at:

http://searching.gao.gov/query.html?qt=department+of+homeland+security&rf=4&amo=3&ayr=2003&bmo=6&byr=2008&col=allsite&col=audprod&col=lglview&col=text&charset=iso-8859-1

Additional References can be found in the numerous investigative and audits reports issued, from March 2003 to June 2008 by the U.S. Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/rpts/

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB):

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/query.html?col=omb&qt=department+of+homeland+security

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Office of Personnel and Management (OPM):

http://search.opm.gov/search?sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&site=default_collection&q=department+of+homeland+security

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC): http://www.osc.gov/successfulcase.htm

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC): http://www.eeoc.gov/

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): http://www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/default.aspx/

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB):

http://www.nlrb.gov/global/search/index.aspx?mode=s&qt=department%20of%20homeland%20security&col=nlrb&gb=y

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Department of Labor: Occupational Safety & Health Administration:

http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/index.html

http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-whistleblower.htm

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Social Security Administration:

http://search.ssa.gov/search?q=department+of+homeland+security&btnG=GO&output=xml_no_dtd&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&ie=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&oe=UTF-8&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&proxyreload=1

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI): http://www.dni.gov/index.html

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s Central Agency of Intelligence (CIA):

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Department of the State (DOS):

http://search.state.gov/search?q=department+of+homeland+security&site=stategov%7Coig%7Cfpc%7Cbmena%7Cusawc%7Cmepi%7Ctravel%7Cexchanges%7Ccareers%7Cfoia%7Caiep%7Cpepfar%7Ccspo&client=stategov_frontend&output=xml_no_dtd&proxystylesheet=stategov_frontend&entqr=3&lr=lang_en&oe=utf8&ie=utf8&sort=date%3AD%3AS%3Ad1&x=13&y=4

Additional References dealing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its agencies can be found at the official website of the Whitehouse’s U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)

http://dodsearch.afis.osd.mil/search?btnG=Search&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&client=defenselink&proxystylesheet=defenselink&site=defense_link&numgm=5&filter=0&proxyreload=1&sort=date%3AD%3AR%3Ad1&q=department+of+homeland+security

WHISTLEBLOWER RESOURCES

http://departmentofhomelandsecurityexposed.com/whistleblower_resources.htm