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Reporter's Notebook: Miguel Contreras

Meet Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez, the only Hispanic Female County Sheriff in America

Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez is a retired ICE special agent, terminal GS-1811-13.

As our Hispanic Heritage Month of October, 2008 is approaching I wanted to take the opportunity to write about someone very special who was a member of a federally class action lawsuit I filed against the Legacy U.S. Customs Service in 1995 on behalf of all Hispanic special agents, grades GS-1811-12 through GS-1811-15: Retired U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) special agent GS-1811-13, Lupe Valdez, and current Dallas (Texas) County Sheriff. Congratulations to the Honorable Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez!

According to Wikipedia Lupe Valdez is an American law enforcement official and the Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas. She is Texas's only elected female sheriff. Born to migrant farm worker parents, she was raised in San Antonio as one of eight children. She started life working in the fields, but paid her way through college earning a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration. She then earned a Master's degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University of Texas at Arlington. Prior to entering law enforcement, Lupe Valdez was an officer in the United States Army. During her time in the Army, she attained the rank of Captain.

Her law enforcement career began as a jailer, first in a county jail and then a federal prison. She then moved on to investigative roles as an agent of the General Services Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and, finally, the U.S. Customs Service where she was a leader in the federal Counter Smuggling Initiative. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, she was made a Senior Agent, serving in that role until her retirement in 2004. In January 2004, Lupe Valdez retired to run for the office of Dallas County Sheriff. Valdez won the 2008 primary, narrowly avoiding a runoff by winning 50.85% in a four-candidate field on March 4, 2008.” She was re-elected for a second term. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lupe_Valdez

I don’t personally know Lupe Valdez, besides meeting her only once during one of the U.S. Customs Service Hispanic conferences in San Antonio, Texas. Lupe was interviewed by the Washington Post and I assume that she was asked if being a Hispanic female had something to do with her election to become a Dallas County Sheriff. Valdez told the Washington Post, “It speaks very well of Dallas County, for them to be comfortable in looking at my credentials and feeling comfortable that I could do the job. What does female, what does Hispanic, what does any of this have to do with this? What is important is your experience, your ability, and your willingness to do the job.”

The reality is that Valdez’s credentials had nothing to do with her being elected as sheriff of Dallas County. Through America, people have elected sheriffs with just a high school education and no law enforcement experience at all. If her credentials would have been taken in consideration, the Legacy U.S. Customs Service would have promoted her to a GS-1811-18-13, senior special agent. Instead she was considered a ‘terminal GS-1811-12” – this was one of the reasons she joined our Customs Hispanic class action lawsuit.

This news story is not about Lupe Valdez’s personality otherwise, I would have opted for not spending my time writing about her. Several of her old friends from the ICE agency believe that the power and authority changed who Lupe was. Some of her old friends attempted to personally congratulate her but she never returned their calls and had her assistant to call them back.

Lupe personally asked me to help her run an ad in our Federal Hispanic Law Enforcement Officers Association’s website when I was the chairman, which I did. After she won the election, she never called me back and when I tried calling her, she never answered my calls. I want to give Lupe the benefit of the doubt. She’s got her hands full and I don’t believe (or I don’t want to believe) that the reason of her lack of response is because she is now “somebody.” The “somebody” she never was with the U.S. Customs Service. The Dallas County Sheriff's Department has an operating budget of 95 million dollars. Lupe employs more than 1,600 personnel and run seven different jail systems with the average population of 8,400 inmates. I assume Lupe is very busy running a good size law enforcement organization, to be concerned about answering an Email or a phone call.

I have studied victims of workplace “bullying” and “mobbing” (discrimination, harassment and retaliation) and for the most part, when an employee who has been the victim of such horrific and traumatic work-place experience, after they leave their job; they want to cut all ties with anybody that had to do with the employer. I assume that this is what happened to Lupe Valdez.

Now let’s turn our attention to the fact that Lupe Valdez with all of her credentials, being a female and a Hispanic was never considered for a promotion with the Legacy U.S. Customs Service prior to march 4, 2003.

The answer is very simple, Lupe Valdez was discriminated against because she was Hispanic and she was not part of the “good-old-boy system” – During my years with the U.S. Customs Service and ICE until my retirement from 1988 until 2006, I saw minority and Whites special agents who did not know how to write at a high school senior level and were not too bright or shall we say smart and intelligent – yet, they got to be promoted to GS-1811-14, GS-1811-15, and ultimately to Senior Executive Series.

Lupe Valdez in my personal view was intelligent, smart, educated, had the law enforcement and criminal investigative experience to not only be promoted to a senior special agent position, but to a supervisory and subsequently upper level managerial position, yes to a Senior Executive Service (SES).

As a general rule in all discrimination cases, you must have at least two parties; the one who got discriminated against and the one who was similarly situated but who got promoted, received special treatment, and/or was “taken care of” – in our case I am selecting Katherine M. Schulte, retired Special Agent in Charge and Senior Executive Series, U.S. Customs Service, Office of Investigations, New Orleans, LA.

In February 2001, the U.S. Customs Today, the official magazine of Customs, issued the following article:

Agents complete mentoring program – February 2001

U.S. Customs Today
By Gerard J. Burg, Jr., Assistant Special Agent-In-Charge, New Orleans

The pilot program concluded with a Leadership Panel discussion chaired by Katherine M. Schulte, SAIC New Orleans. Participating in the panel were Robert W. Weber, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs; Loraine E. Brown, SAIC Los Angeles; and John C. Kelley, Jr., SAIC El Paso. The panel members discussed their individual careers and offered advice and guidance to the agents who participated in the program. The mentees also participated in the discussion, and presented the panel with an overview of the developmental activities they undertook during the course of the program.

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2001/February/custoday_oi.xml

The significance of even mentioning the name of Katherine M. Schulte is actually very insignificant due to the fact that the U.S. Customs Service’s “good-old-boy network system” always takes cares their own. Thus promoting Schulte, who is White to be a SAC (SES) was nothing spectacular unless you know more about her background.  What is special with Katherine M. Schulte is that allegedly she started working as a secretary at the SAC’s Office of Investigations, U.S. Customs Service, New Orleans, LA, that only had a high school diploma and yet, she rose through the ranks to become a SAC, as a Senior Executive Series for the U.S. Customs Service.

In comparison, Lupe Valdez has a bachellor and master degrees, is a former U.S. Army's Captain and has extensive street criminal investigative experience.

Another allegation against Katherine M. Schulte; which was reported along with the above referenced to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Inspector General, and the EEOC was an incident involving her application to become an Associate Special Agent in Charge, grade GS-1811-15, U.S. Customs Service, New Orleans, LA. The allegation/complaint was that she failed to make the Best Qualified List (BQL) in order to be considered by the selecting official, but thanks to “someone” in the position to falsify and alter her score, she made the BQL and subsequently she got to be promoted.

I posted the above U.S. Customs Today story because, Schulte with her questionable credentials was the chairwoman of such a Leadership Panel made up by Robert W. Weber, Loraine E. Brown, and John C. Kelly. This panel was supposedly to promote a mentoring and leadership program for agents who wanted to move up to upper level positions. I wonder why the U.S. Customs selected such panel members with three of them, having integrity issues.  I will only mention one official, Robert W. Weber, who allegedly personally hand-delivered the application package of Kenneth Cates to be the Regional Special Agent in Charge, OIA-El Paso, IA Region 3-Southwest, Office of Internal Affairs. The reason Weber had to hand-deliver Cates’ package I was told was because he had failed the “vetting” process, meaning that Cates was not fit to be promoted to be the Regional SAC for IA, due to integrity issues. I previously reported about the U.S. Customs’ double standard when managing discipline and will not repeat the same.  I believe Robert W. Weber is the ICE's SAC (SES) Office of Investigations, Tampa, FL.

After the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Katherine M. Schulte suddenly retired allegedly because of her questionable credentials. Loraine E. Brown later on retired as well.

Now, if we were to compare Lupe Valdez with Katherine M. Schulte, Lupe was better qualified than Schulte to be promoted to a GS-1811-13, GS-1811-14, and so forth.

Wonder how many current and former U.S. Customs Service and ICE’s Office of Investigations or Internal Affairs/Office of Professional Responsibility would run for a county sheriff’s position in a city and county of the size of Dallas, Texas? I personally believe that if Customs management would have given Lupe Valdez the opportunity to be promoted to a supervisory position, she would have been raised, on her own merits, to a Senior Executive Series position. Who knows, maybe she would have been appointed as the Assistant Commissioner for Investigations or Internal Affairs.

I used Lupe Valdez as an example that in the U.S. Customs Service and ICE, there are numerous hardworking Hispanic special agents with great supervisory and managerial potential, just like Lupe Valdez. Unfortunately, since we no longer have the ICE’s Hispanic class action lawsuit, I predict that things at ICE would go back to the way Customs was in the early 1990s. A few Hispanics will be getting hardly their GS-1811-15s. Unfortunately, for the ICE’s Hispanics who got their Senior Executive Series positions some of them have been arrested by local police officials for sex related crimes. Others, who like to engage in sexual activities in public places, have evaded arrest. Regardless, soon all of our ICE’s Hispanic’s SES will be retiring and I doubt very much we will see the same number of Hispanics at GS-1811-15 and above.

Lupe Valdez, you are an example and a role model for all of us because despite of all of the discrimination, harassment and retaliation that you suffered at Customs and ICE, you nevertheless had the courage and strength to do the unthinkable of running for the Office of the Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas. Too bad, retired ICE top managers Kenneth Cates and Ron Wood were not arrested by the locals for disorderly conduct and drunkenness at a local bar in your county – otherwise, you would have been able to take the opportunity to take their mug-shots.

Hope you keep getting re-elected and don’t worry about all of the negative comments about how you are running your jails and your department. Every county sheriff of a big department like yours has almost the same problems.

One more thing: based on my limited research, I was able to identify only one Hispanic County Sheriff: YOU! The other one is Andrea J. Cabral who was elected on November 2, 2004 and sworn in on January 5, 2005 as the 30th Sheriff of Suffolk County, MA. However, she identified herself as African-American.

References

Democrats Gaining a Foothold in Texas

Increasing Hispanic Population Is Credited With Diversifying Winners of Local Races

By Sylvia Moreno

Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, November 10, 2004; Page A03

DALLAS, Nov. 9 -- Lupe Valdez is a woman, a Hispanic, a Democrat and a lesbian -- and, come Jan. 1, she's entering the ranks of Texas good ol' boys. Valdez is becoming Sheriff Lupe.

Any one description -- female, Latina, Democrat and openly gay -- would have qualified Valdez's election as Dallas County sheriff for the local history books. But all four?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37994-2004Nov9.html

Feminist Daily News Wire
November 16, 2004

First Female Sheriff Elected in Dallas, Texas

Lupe Valdez, a Democratic, Latina, openly gay woman, won the election for sheriff in Dallas County, Texas. The New York Times explains that she defeated her opponent, Danny Chandler, a former chief deputy, by 17,000 votes. Valdez is the first female sheriff to be elected in Dallas County, as well as the first Hispanic sheriff to be elected. Dallas County also elected its first Hispanic district judge, and both are Democratic women. This election reflects a growing Democratic and Latino electorate in one of Texas’s largest urban counties, according to the Washington Post.

During her childhood, she traveled and worked with her family of migrant workers. Her mother insisted on her, the youngest of eight, being educated, so they settled in San Antonio. She then worked her way through college, joined the Army Reserves, became a county jail guard, and applied for the Federal Bureau of Prisons. After becoming a federal guard, she attained a Master’s degree in Criminology and worked as an agent for the General Services Administration, the Agriculture Department, and finally, the Customs Service until she retired early to run for sheriff, as reported by the New York Times

Valdez told the Washington Post, “It speaks very well of Dallas County, for them to be comfortable in looking at my credentials and feeling comfortable that I could do the job. What does female, what does Hispanic, what does any of this have to do with this? What is important is your experience, your ability, and your willingness to do the job.”

http://feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=8748

 

 

Comments

Meet Lupe Valdez

The writer of this piece has an obvious bias against his former employer, the United States Customs Service.  And he uses this forum to voice his perceived complaints against that now defunct service and apparently some of the folks he has greivances against.

 

At first, I thought the article was intended to congratulate the Sheriff of Dallas County on her election to the position.  But on closer examination it appears to be a complaint that the Sheriff has not deemed it necessary to contact Mr. Contreras directly ("After she won the election, she never called me back and when I tried calling her, she never answered my calls.").

 

The writer then morph's the article into a general accusation of perceived grievances against the former Customs Service and some of it's former employees for alleged discrimination against Hispanics.  Contreras fails to note of course that many Hispanics have been elevated to positions of authority in the former Customs Service - to name just a few (1) SAC- San Antonio- Robinette, (2)SAC-El Paso-Medina, SAC-Tucson-Pena, etc etc etc)

 

Mr. Contreras then goes on to attack former SAIC Kathy Schulte, Ken Cates, and a number of other former US Customs Service Office of Investigations employees that apparently he had a problem with.

 

Mr. Contreras cannot even get the details of Ms. Schulte's background correct.  The fact is that Ms. Schulte started her career with the United States Customs Service in Los Angeles in the mid to late 1970's as a Customs Patrol Officer.

 

The article is replete with unfounded allegations, inferring that persons who retired after lengthy careers did so because of unnamed problems or because they were unqualified.

 

Mr. Contreras was previously a Criminal Investigator/Special Agent with the US Customs Service's Office of Internal Affairs - I shudder to think what the quality of his investigative report were, if this article is an example.

 

Nigel Brooks

Former - US Customs Office of Investigations Special Agent -Retired

 

 

The truth unfortunately sometimes hurts

Mr. Brooks: 

     You are right, I am not a friend of the Legacy U.S. Customs Service, or the Immigration & Customs Enforcement.  In  fact, I considered myself the most hated Customs/ICE special agent employee of such a disgraced agency.  If you are a retired U.S. Customs special agent, may be you remember all of the news reports that Dave Kidwell of the Miami Herald wrote in the 1980s and early 1990s and the subsequent U.S. Congressional hearings held subsequent to the Miami Herald's investigative reporting on U.S. Customs' corruption and mismanagement.

    Basically almost everything I have written for Narco News from 1988 until 2006, have been documented and filed in different judicial and administrative courts, as well as with the FBI and other oversight federal agencies.   

     My criminal investigative career did not start with Customs.  I was an ATF special agent before.  If you want to know the type of investigator I was, please contact the agents I worked with not only at ATF but at INS, and Customs and they will tell you that I was not the type who waited for my "duty agent calls" to make cases. 

     As to Kathy Schulte, according to my sources, before she became a Customs CPO, do you know what job she held?  I used to be a Resident Agent in Charge with the Office of Internal Affairs, U.S. Customs.  During this time, I learned tons of "inside" information that I am not privy to even post in Narco News. 

     Mr. Brooks, you seem to know more about the "in and outs" of U.S. Customs, which leads me to conclude that you were probably more than simply a "special agent."  (by the way, I know who you are and about your time you spent writing in other website forums).

    As to my story about Lupe Valdez, for your information, I have high regards for Lupe.  You need to be Hispanic and being discriminated, retaliated and harassed by the U.S. Customs Service and ICE in order to understand my story about Lupe Valdez.      

    As to my co-publisher investigative news reporter Mr. Bill Conroy, his writing code of ethics is unquestionable.  He only writes what he can only verify with facts.  When you question any of his stories, my suggestion is that you be prepared to back-up your comments with facts.  Otherwise, Mr. Conroy will respond accordingly. 

    You basically accuse me of spreading unfounded rumors about certain management officials.  One of the reasons these allegations were never proven was because the Treasury's OIG and Customs' IA failed to do their job. 

    Since you seem to know about Kathy Schulte and Ken Cates, do you know why they retired from their SAC positions?

    In closing, I would like to repeat that at the U.S. Customs and ICE, there was/is a "good-old-boy system" in place.  For certain special agents, specially Hispanics, Blacks and other minorities, we had to walk an "extra mile" to get what we deserved on merit.  Unfortunately for me, I decided to "speak-up" and challenge the U.S. Customs Service in court.  You don't have to believe what I write.  However, may I suggest that you read what hundreds of other former and retired U.S. Customs and ICE special agents are writing in other Internet websites about their experiences and about how they feel about management at ICE and Legacy U.S. Customs (which it appears that you strongly support).  You see, the truth sometimes hurts....but the truth shall make us free at the end.  I truly enjoy your comments.         

 

 

  

Response to Nigel Brooks

 Mr. Nigel Brooks:  I don't intend to convert this Narco News media site into a "blogging" Internet site, the one you are so used to use, see, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=special+agent+nigel+brooks.

    You mentioned the word "perceived" in my writings....Hope you don't believe that the arrest and conviction of ICE's SAC Frank Figueroa for masturbating in public was a perceived event.  To be honest with you, I don't intend to become another "target" of your well known smearing Internet writing attacks.  However, you asked and question about my criminal investigative experience.  I am posting an outdated (2001) write-up I used when I applied for a GS-1811-15's position, which by the way, put me in more than one ocassion in the Best Qualified List, twice as the Special Agent in Charge for IA in Los Angeles, CA.   

KNOWLEDGE OF INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES TO PLAN, DEVELOP AND CONDUCT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 

I have degrees in criminal justice administration, law enforcement and business from Michigan State University, Lansing Community College and Arizona Western College.  On March 1, 1993, I received the designation of Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.  On November I, 1997, I received from the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) the designation of Certified Protection Professional (CPP).  Further, I applied for and obtained from the International Foundation of Protection Officers (IFPO) the designation of Certified Protection Officer (CPO) and the Certified Security Supervisor (CSS).

I have been a member of the International Association of Chief of Police; the American Society for Industrial Security; the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners; the International Narcotics Officers Association and the American Association of Hispanic Federal Executives.  In addition, I have successfully completed training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center during my employment with the U.S. Customs Service, ATF, INS and DIS and have completed other police in-service education at other training institutions (For more on education and training, please refer to the attached form OF-612).

As the Resident Agent in Charge for the Office of Internal Affairs, U.S. Customs Service, Calexico, California (OIACX), I was solely responsible for the conduct and performance of my subordinates.  As such, I ensured that they mastered the concepts, principles, and methods of a broad major area of the field of criminal investigations in the U. S. Customs Service.  This involved expert knowledge of the enforcement and investigative techniques and procedures and the legal framework in which the program operates; and a high level of skill in interpreting the laws, rules and regulations within the Office of Internal Affairs, where accepted methods and principles are questioned or challenged; and skill in successfully bringing cases to conclusion and otherwise resolving unprecedented, broad, difficulty, or complex problems.

On July 10, 1997, a confidential source of information stated that there was a corrupt border inspector at the Calexico Port of Entry who was allowing vehicles laden with illegal aliens and possibly narcotics enter the United States at Calexico without inspection.  Allegedly, the alien smuggling organization was charging between $1,000 and $1,200 per illegal alien.  With the assistance of the Office of Investigations and the U.S. Border Patrol’s Anti-Smuggling Unit, the OIACX successfully monitored and arranged several alien smuggling ventures through the border inspector who was positively identified as Arthur QUAN.  Also, the OIACX determined that one of the principal’s conspirators in the bribery and alien smuggling operation was QUAN’s mother, Azucena QUAN.  On September 20, 1997, we obtained a Federal search warrant for QUAN’s residence, after effecting a controlled alien smuggling operation.  In addition to arresting QUAN and seven other conspirators, 19 illegal aliens were arrested.

On September 22, 1997, Customs Inspector Arthur QUAN, civilians Maria Azucena QUAN, Ana Milagros ANDRADE, Teresa Andrade SARABIA, David MEZA, Francisco BONILLA Balanos, Valentin Fernandez CORRALES and Manuel MORALES appeared before U.S. Magistrate Joseph A. Schmitt in connection with their September 20, 1997's arrest.  All eight defendants were charged with a total of 16 counts each for violating Title 18 U.S.C., Section 201(b), Bribery of Public Officials and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2, Aiding and Abetting; Title 8 U.S.C., Section 1324 (a) (2) (B) (ii), Bringing in Illegal Aliens; Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2, Aiding and Abetting; Title 8 U.S.C., Section 1324 (a) (2) (B) (iii), Bringing in Illegal Aliens, Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2, Aiding and Abetting; and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 1546 (a), Fraud and Misuse, Permits and Other Documents and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2, Aiding and Abetting.

On August 29, 1993, I was requested to become the principal undercover operative in a task force money laundering investigation entitled OPERATION COSTA DEL ORO.  Participating agencies and offices include the SAC/Detroit (OI), RAC/Oxnard (OI), state and local police departments from California and Michigan.  My direct participation in this operation was my infiltration into this Colombian drug smuggling and trafficking organization spearheaded by Ruben Dario MENDEZ-Rascon, AKA: Aldo, a native and citizen of Colombia.  Subsequently, I collected millions of dollars from MENDEZ and associates and delivered 200 kilograms of cocaine to MENDEZ prior to their arrests.  During my undercover meetings and negotiations with MENDEZ-Rascon and others conspirators, I successfully gathered incriminating statements that were used at their subsequent trial and other judicial proceedings relative to seizures of tangible assets, i.e., cars, homes etc., under Title 21 U.S.C., Section 881 (Controlled Substance-Civil Forfeiture) and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 981 (Money Laundering Control Act-Civil Forfeiture).

On November 24, 1994, MENDEZ was convicted on seven counts of narcotics trafficking and money laundering during a five-week trial in Los Angeles, CA.  On May 22, 1995, a U.S. District Court Judge sentenced MENDEZ to serve 295 months in federal prison.  He was charged with laundering more than four million dollars via undercover agents along with the brokering of 200 kilograms of cocaine.  The writer and a Michigan State Police Trooper negotiated all undercover activities with MENDEZ and others that also were arrested and prosecuted.

I managed and directed an Organized Crime Drug Task Force (OCDETF) investigation involving the smuggling and distributing of ton quantities of marijuana in the Detroit, Michigan area.  The U. S. Customs Service was the lead agency.  This case was supported by DEA, the Michigan State Police, the Oakland Sheriff's Office and the Troy Police Department.  This task force investigation entitled OPERATION TRES AMIGOS targeted drug suppliers and smugglers in the state of Sonora in the Republic of Mexico and in the states of Michigan and Arizona in the United States.  In the course of this investigation, I applied for and obtained court approved electronic communication intercepts (Title III); applied and obtained Federal civil warrants and seized property under Title 21 U.S.C., Section  881 (Controlled Substances-Civil Forfeitures) belonging to targets of this investigation under Title 18 U.S.C., Section 881; pen registers and utilized confidential sources of information; conducted undercover drug buys; conducted 24 hours surveillance for periods up to ten consecutive days and requested the assistance of Customs Attaches and other SAC and RAC offices throughout the continental United States.    

On February 7, 1996, a Federal Grand Jury, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, issued a nine-count indictment in which Javier ZAVALA-Nicols, Gregory Mark BLANCHARD, Mark Edward HAYWARD, Stephen Craig ZACHARY, and James Charles REED were charged with violations of Title 21 U.S.C., Sections 846, 963, 841 (a)(1) and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2.  BLANCHARD, HAYWARD, REED, ZACHARY, ZAVALA-Nicols and REED entered guilty pleas to Conspiracy to Distribute Marijuana (Title 21 U.S.C., Section 846).  Subsequently all conspirators received the following prison sentences: ZAVALA-Nicols (84 months), HAYWARD (18 months), ZACHARY (33 months), BLANCHARD (30 months) and REED (66 months).

I was the case agent in the above referenced investigation and was solely responsible for the development and gathering of all physical evidence used during the indictment, arrest and conviction of the defendants.  I initiated this investigation when on or about February 25, 1993, and while surveilling a suspected "stash house" in Birmingham, Michigan observed a late model Ford containing four Hispanics who looked suspicious.  The car pulled into the driveway of a nearby residence.  I query the address in an attempt to learn who the residents were.  I learned that a subject by the name of Fernando MONDRAGON-Murillo was the current tenant.  Subsequently, through EPIC, NCIC, TECS and ADP queries revealed that MONDRAGON-Murillo had an extensive criminal history for drug related offenses.  I immediately served subpoenas for his phone records, which ultimately disclosed that he was making telephone calls to class one drug violators in Arizona and in Sonora, Mexico. 

On February 25, 1993, at approximately 3:30 a.m., I went to MONDRAGON-Murillo's residence and collected his trash.  An examination of the trash revealed seven plastic wrappings, which contained a green leafy residue that field-tested, positive for marijuana.  Based on this, I applied and obtained a Federal search warrant for MONDRAGON-Murillo's address.  The execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of 44 pounds of marijuana, $46,735.00 and one (1) vehicle, as well as the arrest of MONDRAGON-Murillo for violation of Title 21 U.S.C., Section 841 - Possession with Intent to Distribute marijuana.  Also arrested was his girlfriend, Maria Teresa RANGEL for money laundering offenses.

During the first phase of this investigation, I was able to identify another conspirator who was instrumental in this smuggling venture, Fernando's older brother, Juan MONDRAGON-Murillo, who was later arrested and convicted by the Illinois State Police for marijuana transportation and possession charges.

On August 26, 1993, I arrested Sabah S. FARHAN with the assistance of other SAC/Detroit (OI) and RAC/Detroit (IA) agents for bribery in violation of Title 18 U.S.C., 201.  The arrest was a result of a 5-month investigation by OI and IA.  I initiated the investigation when FARHAN approached me and asked for my corrupt services in the facilitation of the smuggling of several Iraqis into the United States.  The Iraqis at that time, were residing in Cuba.  FARHAN offered me $3,000.00 per illegal alien.  During undercover meetings and telephonic conversations with FARHAN, I ascertained that he no longer needed my services for the smuggling venture.  However, he asked me if I would be interested in stealing pound quantities of seized gold from the CMC/Detroit's evidence vault for his own use.  Subsequently, FARHAN was convicted and sentenced.

While assigned to the Detroit office, I noticed the need of implementing operational programs within the SAC Detroit's jurisdictional boundaries, in the area of drug and currency interdictions.  Subsequently, I submitted for approval, three investigative project proposals to the Special Agent in Charge.  The first proposal; "OPERATION EMILIANO ZAPATA" was to be a group-oriented project designated to establish a network of financial institutions controlled by the United States Customs Service (Undercover project class 1), in order to identify and penetrate individuals and financial institutions that were involved in violations of CMIR reporting requirements and related offenses. 

The second project proposal consisted in setting up a joint task force with U.S. Customs, the Wayne Co. Sheriff's Department, the Michigan State Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canada Customs in an effort to identify and target criminal elements utilizing the Detroit Metropolitan-International and the Windsor International airports.  The project consisted in obtaining daily inventories of parked Canadian vehicles at the Detroit International airport and provided this information to the Canadian authorities who in return would give U.S. Customs vehicle owner identification and criminal records.  Daily interface with the RCMP was to result in the identification of drug/money laundering suspects with enforcement action taken that was to benefit the U.S./Canadian drug enforcement effort.    

The third project proposal was entitled "CARGO CONSPIRACY ENFORCEMENT TEAM" (CCET) initiative.  In an effort to enhance Customs interdiction efforts, I, through the SAC/Detroit initiated the CCET for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting international drug trafficking and money laundering organizations that were utilizing commercial cargo facilities to smuggle controlled substances and to import and export illicit derived United States currency and other monetary instruments. 

In November 1992, the U.S. Customs Service’s Mail Branch intercepted two pounds of cocaine secreted in wooden tables in Miami, FL and destined to the Detroit, MI area.  Subsequently, a controlled delivered of the two pounds of cocaine was effected by members of the SAC/Detroit (OI) Group 4.  The controlled delivery was effected without incident and a native and citizen of Colombia was arrested.  I interviewed him and obtained his cooperation.  He provided information that led us to conduct a second controlled delivery in New York, NY.  With the assistance of the SAC/New York (OI) and the U.S. Postal Inspectors, a controlled delivery was effected in New York City,  culminating with the arrest of Carlos Alberto PELAEZ and Carlos CORREA-Salazar and two other individuals, all native and citizens of Colombia.  One of the two individuals provided information regarding her ex-husband who was suspected of swallowing heroin and smuggling it into the United States from Colombia.  I placed a TECS look out on the ex-husband and he was later arrested in Miami, FL when he attempted to smuggle large quantities of heroin in his body.  PELAEZ and CORREA subsequently pled guilty to importation of cocaine.        

As a senior special agent with the U.S. Customs Service, I have initiated solid complex criminal investigations, which have resulted in the successful prosecution of numerous defendants.  I also have participated in Title III investigations where I was a group leader and have monitored telephone conversations of suspected drug/currency violators.  I have transcribed recordings from Spanish to English and from English to Spanish, which were eventually introduced as evidence in Federal court.  I have learned the mechanics of applying for a court-approved wiretap.  I am familiar with court rulings, Attorney General and Customs rules and regulations regarding the application for an order to intercept electronic communications under the Electronic Surveillance Act.

In complex conspiracy investigations, I as case agent have verbally directed several special agents in the investigation of certain aspects of major cases.  I am thoroughly familiar with the necessity for management and control of confidential informants in the field of law enforcement and have solicited, developed and maintained numerous such sources of information.  While managing and directing investigations, confidential informants and witnesses, I have come to recognize the need to maintain authoritative control of such individuals.  I have been instrumental in arranging interviews and meetings with Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other law enforcement personnel from Treasury, Justice and other criminal justice agencies.

During my employ with the RAC/Calexico, I initiated several programs.  In 1989, I initiated a child pornography project which consisted in setting up undercover mail drops, store fronts, etc.  All with the objective in identifying violators.  Later. I initiated and developed a strategic case involving the illegal importation of microcomputer chips from Mexico.  In this investigation in which I was the case agent, directed and managed all aspects of an undercover operation.

On January 22, 1991, I responded to the Calexico Port of Entry regarding the attempted smuggling of 873 pounds of marijuana by Sinai Alejandra QUINTANA.  I interviewed QUINTANA after she waived her right to counsel.  Subsequently, QUINTANA cooperated with the government  by providing information on the person responsible for the smuggling venture, Conrado ACOSTA-Rodriguez.  I conducted a follow-up investigation and with the assistance of  the RAC/Riverside (OI), I was able to secure a civil seizure warrant for ACOSTA’s residence valued at $300,000.  I also obtained a federal arrest warrant for ACOSTA and served it while he was hospitalized in a Los Angeles area hospital.  On June 18, 1991, ACOSTA pled guilty to violating Title 21 U.S.C., Sections 952 and 960, Conspiracy to Import Marijuana.

From October 10, 1989 to December 20, 1989, I was assigned to a special operation entitled OPERATION GREENLINE managed by the SAC/San Diego, CA (OI), which incorporated a court ordered wire intercept.  I was assigned full-time to the wire room as a monitor/transcriber.  In this position, I was responsible for monitoring both phone calls and back room conversation at the target location, judging their pertinence and recording the substance of those conversations on daily logs.  During the intercept, I was also assigned as a team leader on my shift, which required me to, at times, coordinate the activities of others assigned to my shift. 

Group Supervisor Philip W. Roberts gave me a temporary assignment job performance evaluation for my participation in OPERATION GREENLINE, where he wrote:  “The employee did well in both monitoring and transcribing conversations.  This was accomplished many times under adverse conditions such as poor quality reception due to background noise.  The employee showed dedication and determination and was able to work without supervision.  The employee, as a team leader, insured that all necessary reporting requirements were met and provided assistance and coordination to coworkers as needed.  On numerous occasions the employee took it upon himself to review previous calls in an attempt to associate similar conversations.  The employee frequently took his own time to transcribe specific conversations, which he independently selected because he felt they would be beneficial to the development of the case.  The employee was always willing to go beyond what was expected of him and to volunteer for collateral assignments associated to the case.  The employee was an asset to the wire room and the overall operation as a whole.”  

On May 15, 1991, the Pacific Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement granted me a Sustained Superior Performance Award in recognition for my “outstanding contributions during and subsequent to OPERATION GREENLINE.”

As a Customs agent, I have investigated and completed complex and technical investigations, especially in the areas of general and narcotics smuggling, fraud and critical technology that have provided me with a knowledge to operate at efficient levels.  Specific tasks have included interviewing techniques, review of accounting and financial records for pertinent data and reliance upon my knowledge of Customs commercial procedures.

On numerous occasions, while assigned as the duty agent for the Office of Investigations, I have been summoned by other Customs personnel to investigate many different types of criminal and civil violations, ranging from smuggling merchandise to currency violations.  As a consequence, I have investigated numerous alleged or suspected violators of Customs and related laws.

All of the criminal cases that were submitted to the U.S. Attorney by me resulted in the successful prosecution of the defendants.  Said cases were only successful because I appropriately applied the laws, regulations, rules of criminal procedure, and rules on the admissibility of evidence.

During my employment with ATF, Los Angeles Special Agent in Charge often commended me for the leadership, guidance and moral support I provided to the Tucson, Arizona post of duty.  On several occasions, I was given the opportunity to supervise other ATF agents, state and local police officers during critical criminal investigations in which I was the case agent and group leader.  My then ATF supervisor often nominated me to be the District Agent of the Quarter, due to my contributions as an ATF agent against violent crime.  Thanks to my initiatives, the ATF Tucson office, for two years led the district in case production.

On many investigations, I independently prepared affidavits, criminal complaints and warrants, in accordance with rules of criminal procedure, court rulings, and Customs policy.  I have offered advice in this area to special agents during the preparation of affidavits for search or arrest warrants.  In 1988, while working for ATF, a U.S. Magistrate, who was known to be very meticulously and critical on affidavits, commended me in one occasion during an application for a search warrant based on an affidavit prepared by me and submitted to his office.

One occasion, I became number two nationwide in case production and convictions.  During this period, I earned outstanding yearly job performance evaluations.  My job performance served as role model for other agents working at the ATF Tucson office.  When I transferred to U.S. Customs in 1988, the ATF Associate Director for Enforcement wrote me a letter.  He wrote:   "Your individual law enforcement efforts and endeavors have not gone unnoticed.  We in the Office of Law Enforcement appreciate the investigative talents, and abilities you contributed in the fight against violent crime.  We are especially appreciative of the   dedicated service you have given to Federal law enforcement and to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.  I want to take this opportunity to wish you success in the new career you have chosen, and I hope you will find some satisfaction in knowing that you will be missed by your associates and peers in ATF. Good luck in the future.”

While in ATF, I was able to consistently show the ability to seek out, recognize and aggressively develop potential violations in a prompt and effective manner.  While initiating and developing criminal cases, I noticed an increasing number of Mexican drug traffickers armed with assault-typed rifles, i.e., Norinco AK-47s, Colt AR-15s etc.,.  A review and analysis of closed case files, intelligence reports and contacts with state, local and other federal law enforcement officials, indicated that almost all of the firearms seized in the United States or in Mexico, were usually purchased in the United States and later smuggled into Mexico. 

Concern over the flow of those weapons and the seizure of 160 AK-47s in Agua Prieta and 88 AK-47s in Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police in 1987, prompted me to analyze the situation, identified the problem and initiated a firearm’s enforcement program.  In order to initiate an investigation of this magnitude, I submitted a detailed project report to ATF/HQ.  I reported statistical data, examples, objectives, plan and strategies.  The long-term objective proposal was the identification, location, apprehension, indictment and conviction of individuals and groups involved in the violation of Federal firearms laws.

In my proposal, I requested the participation of the SAC/Tucson (U.S. Customs).  With the approval of my project, one Customs agent and four ATF agents were assigned to work full time on PROJECT AKS.  At the conclusion of this project, several individuals were arrested and convicted for violations of ATF and Customs laws and several thousands of dollars were seized in asset forfeitures.

In 1987, I initiated an investigation (Case # 93180-87-5045T) when officials at the Iowa State Prison intercepted two cryptic letters to inmates containing photographs of two men holding various firearms and displaying police equipment, such as handcuffs, radios, badges, raid hats, etc.  The return address was in South Tucson, Arizona, and proved to be nonexistent.  The two people in the photographs were subsequently identified to be two former Iowa Prison inmates, one of which was still on parole.  It was learned they were living in Tucson and I was able to obtain a federal search warrant for their residence, in part by using the date of release of a record album visible in one of the photographs to establish the maximum age of the photograph.  The ensuing search resulted in the discovery of a number of firearms and the preparation of a criminal case report charging the two suspects with violations of the Gun Control Act of 1968, to wit: Title 18 U.S.C., Section 922, and a third subject with aiding and abetting in the receipt of firearms by a felon.

In 1987, while conducting intelligence queries at the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, I learned that the sheriff’s office had confiscated a sawed-shotgun.  Subsequently, I determined that there was not a prosecutable ATF case.  However, I followed-up and developed the suspect into an approved confidential informant who furnished information about a marijuana “stash house” (Case # 93180-87-5072F).  I coordinated with local authorities and assisted them in the obtaining of a state search warrant for narcotics resulting in the seizure of 150 pounds of marijuana and three firearms, including an illegal weapon.  I prepared a criminal case report charging violations of Title 26 U.S.C., Section 5861(d) (Possession of an illegal firearm) and Title 18 U.S.C., Section 924(c) (Possession of Firearms in the Commission of a Drug Felony offense).  Later, the informant supplied information on a narcotic trafficker and illegal alien who used a firearm when conducting drug transactions.  I obtained a federal search warrant which was served with the assistance of DEA and led the subject being indicted and convicted on federal firearms and narcotic charges.

Also in 1987, I received a request for assistance from the Border Patrol on an illegal alien with firearms who had used his vehicle to block Border Patrol agents from pursuing a suspected narcotic load car.  I secured a federal arrest warrant for the suspect for violations of the Gun Control Act of 1968.  The suspect was eventually arrested, indicted and convicted.

In 1986, a convicted felon was found to be buying a large number of firearms.  In an attempt to make an undercover contact with the suspect, I went to an associate of the suspect who operated a retail odd and end business.  Posing as a resident of Mexico, I asked where I could obtain some firearms.  The associate gave me the suspect’s telephone number and I was able to set up a meeting with the suspect that eventually lead to a number of firearm purchases and admission from the suspect that he sold hundreds of firearms to Mexicans.  The investigation culminated in a “buy bust” with the seizure of seven firearms and the recovery of a quantity of stolen property, including a motorcycle.  I used a number of investigative techniques during this investigation and through my planning developed a very sound criminal case on a person who was believed to be a significant source of firearms to Mexico.

Also in 1986, I initiated an investigation on a person who had purchased nine (9) handguns on one occasion from a gun dealer.  FBI checks revealed the suspect had numerous felony arrests in Florida, but no convictions.  Finding the address used on the 4473 was a vacant house, I went to a different address found on the suspect’s driver’s license.  In an undercover capacity, I contacted the occupants of that location and discovered that the suspect used that address only to get the Arizona driver’s license and that he lived in Florida, but traveled to Arizona approximately every two months, staying at different hotels.  I, posing as a gun dealer, left a message with the occupants to have the suspect contact me the next time he came to Tucson.

I, then contacted motels in the Tucson area and found where the suspect had stayed on several occasions and requested the motels to contact me if the suspect checked in again.

Later, a manger of a local motel contacted me to advise the suspect had just rented a room.  Surveillance was set up and I subsequently established the suspect was driving a car stolen in Florida.  I referred this information to the local police, who along with other ATF agents, arrested the suspect on state auto theft charges.  Later, I obtained a federal indictment charging the suspect with using a false name and address to buy the nine firearms.  The suspect was  subsequently convicted for violating the Gun Control Act of 1968.

In 1986, I assisted the Santa Ana ATF office where I posed as a resident of Mexico in an investigation of a federal firearm’s dealer(FFL).  After being introduced to the FFL and some of his employees, I was able to obtain firearms through “straw purchases.”  The FFL then hired me to commit a contract murder.  The murder was subsequently staged and reconnects with the suspect resulted in obtaining damaging admissions.  According to the Santa Ana ATF RAC, I did an outstanding undercover job which lead to state solicitation for murder and ATF firearm charges.  The suspect was  later indicted and convicted.

In summary, as an ATF agent between September 16, 1986 and September 16, 1987, I submitted 22 criminal case reports with a total of 31 defendants and from September 12, 1985 and September 12, 1986, I initiated eighteen (18) criminal investigations, one administrative forfeiture investigation, submitted fourteen (14) criminal case reports, completed several collateral investigations and completed one relief from disability investigation.                   

During my employ with INS, I was often requested to participate in sensitive investigations involving suspected corrupt INS employees.  In 1984, I was selected among several other applicants to infiltrate, in an undercover capacity, a major drug and alien organization based in Sonora, Mexico and Arizona.  This was an internal affairs investigation, which was coordinated with Customs' Office of Internal affairs.  The subjects of the investigation were INS and Customs border inspectors.  I was directed to travel to the Mexican interior with another undercover agent and a confidential source of information.

As a police officer (Patrolman I) I worked shifts, responded to crimes in progress, i.e., burglaries, armed robberies, murder, shooting incidents, rapes in progress, interviewed witnesses, victims and suspects, served subpoenas and summons, directed traffic, executed search and arrest warrants, arrested without a warrant and on probable cause, testified in court, wrote reports and performed other duties as assigned.

In December 5, 1997, I joined the distinguished group of security professionals who have earned recognition as a Certified Protection Professional (CPP).  More than 6,000 security practitioners worldwide have been awarded the CPP credential, which attests to an individual’s mastery of the body of security knowledge through job experience and academic study.  This elite group has demonstrated their competence of security practices through an intensive-testing program.  As a result, these men and women have earned the respect of their colleagues, their employers, and the public as proven leaders in their field.

The CPP designation is earned by passing a difficult exam, which covers a wide range of security topics, after meeting strict experience and/or education prerequisites.  To maintain the credential, I will have to pursue a program of continuing education and professional activity to earn required recertification credits every three years.

For years the world has recognized a need for well-trained, competent, committed security professionals who are able to effectively and efficiently handle even the most complex or dangerous situations.  As threats increase, so has the emphasis on increased security - and for people who are better able to prevent crime and react well during crisis situations - strengthened the demand for professional security managers.  To meet these needs, the American Society for Industrial Security administers the stringent CPP program.

On March 3, 1993, The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners granted me the designation of a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE).  The CFE designation is awarded to select professionals responsible for detecting, deterring, and investigating fraud.  Each CFE must meet the rigorous criteria of the Association's certification program, including character, experience and education requirements. 

CFE's must demonstrate professional skills in the area of fraud detection and/or deterrence.  In general, a CFE must have a minimum of: 1) a baccalaureate degree from a recognized institution of higher learning; 2) two or more years of professional experience in a related field; and 3) successful completion of the Uniform CFE Examination.  All CFE's must exemplify the highest moral and ethical standards, and must agree to adhere to the Certified Fraud Examiner Code of Professional Ethics.  Additionally, CFE's are required to acquire at least 20 credit hours of continuing professional education per year.

Certified Fraud Examiners are responsible for resolving a wide range of allegations regarding fraud and white collar crime.  CFE's take statements, assembles evidence, writes reports, testifies to finding, and assist in the prevention and detection of fraud.  Certified Fraud Examiners are employed by government investigative agencies, corporations, and private concerns.  CFE's also are utilized in the private sector, where they provide investigative and consulting services to law firms, business enterprises, and others in the areas of litigation support, fraud investigation, and fraud prevention.

The Association administers the stringent criteria for the CFE program, which includes the Uniform CFE Examination, a rigorous two-day examination designed to asses a candidate's knowledge of four topic areas: fraud auditing, the legal elements of fraud, criminology and ethics, and investigations of fraud.  Fewer than one person in five has passed the Uniform Examination on the first attempt.

To date, more than 10,000 business and government professionals have earned the CFE designation.

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, founded in 1988, is a professional accrediting organization dedicated to the deterrence of fraud in government and the private sector.  The Association's mission is to educate qualified individuals in the highly comprehensive techniques of fraud detection, investigation and prevention.   

 

 

 

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