DHS-ICE: More Badges of Dishonor

The primary reason I decided to write this paper is due to the fact that the problems in the management and accountability of firearms at the Legacy U.S. Customs Service now known as ICE continued and undoubtedly continues to be a problem at ICE. Plus the employees involved in misconduct keep getting promoted. Welcome to DHS-ICE: More Badges of Dishonor.

During a firearms inventory on or about February 16, 1999 conducted by then special agent David F. Fry assigned to the Legacy U.S. Customs Service’s Office of Investigations, Yuma, Arizona. Fry noticed that special agent Rory B. Hale’s Customs’ issued shotgun was missing after he conducted a routine physical eye inspection of all firearms assigned to the Yuma, AZ office which at the time the resident agent in charge was Steven D. Arizaga and two group supervisors Kyle E. Barnette and John Turner, who subsequently were promoted and relocated to Nogales and Phoenix, Arizona, respectively where they became resident agents in charge.  Within a few months and after having remodeled his Nogales Customs office, Barnette gets another promotion by the then SAC Awilda Villafane, a decision that later on she regreted, after she was removed from her position.  Barnette became an Associate SAC, GS-1811-15, and was moved to Tucson, AZ and John Turner asked to be transferred to Texas.  Awilda retired after one of her subordinate employees, a woman twice her size filed a police assault complaint against her boss.  Awilda was also accused of committing some type of fraud when purchasing some items for her office.  She was replaced by Steve Minas, who had previously served under Awilda as Associate SAC.  Minas became SAC and was this writer SAC, when Minas authorized a questionable personnel action to be taken against this writer.  Within a few months, after the action was taken, Minas got demoted, Arizaga suddenly retired and the Associate Chief Counsel Dyann Medina resigned.       

On Tuesday February 16, 1999 at 1:26 p.m. agent Hale called the Yuma Police Department and reported a burglary. The report was taken by telephone by Yuma police officer (YPO) A. Roman, badge 5639, squad D. On his Offense Report Number 9900001889, YPO Roman wrote on his narrative that SA Hale’s shotgun had been taken from his garage. Property Taken: one 91) Remington 870 12 Ga. Short Barrel Shotgun in a Black case, serial number W381112M and valued at $300.00. Attachment: Victim’s (agent Hale) Rights Information Serial Number LMY046892.

According to agent Hale, a meeting took place between Arizaga, Fry, Hale and Hale’s immediate supervisor. A conspiracy took place at this meeting for agent Hale to call the local Yuma Police Department and file a false police report claiming that the shotgun had been stolen.

YPO Roman wrote on his narrative the following:

“On 02/16/99 at around 1426 hours, I spoke with R. Hale by telephone in reference to a burglary.

Hale called to report that sometime between 8/98 and Sund. (02/14/99) an unknown subject (s) entered the garage to his residence located at 3009 W. 11^th Ln and took the listed weapon (PT # 1). He stated the shotgun had been located on the floor in the corner of the garage. He had no INL information. He gave me a description and value of the shotgun. He had nothing further at this time.

I gathered HALE’s information for the report and then gave him the report number. I told him to call back should he have anything further. I then ended the contact.

NO FURTHER ACTION TAKEN.”

Other information on YPO Roman indicates that the reported burglary was a felony offense under Arizona Revised Statute Title 13-1507A, that there was no force entry and the report was marked under special attention: Investigations and the case status: open-inactive.

On April 1, 1999, agent Hale’s under the instructions of his immediate supervisor, Fry and Arizaga was asked to file a Report of Property For Survey, Customs Form 52, whereby agent Hale reports that his above referenced shotgun is reported stolen. Agent Hale signed this federal document stating:

“I certify that the following/attached statement is true and complete giving all facts known to me relating to this matter, including the identity of other persons directly responsible for, or having knowledge of, the circumstances involved. (Attach statement as required).

On April 12, 1999, the Report of Property For Survey, Customs Form 52 is faxed two pages to the Office of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Tucson, AZ, fax number 520-670-6233 which according to several federal documents posted in the Internet confirms that the fax machine is located Customs SAC’s Office of investigations.

The criminal conspiracy by Arizaga, group supervisor, Fry, and Hale was completed.

On June 22, 1999, the U.S. Customs Service’s Firearms Board of Survey is signed by five (5) members with a recommendation that “The Accountable Officer Be Relieved of Liability.”

Subsequently after the Report of Property For Survey, Customs Form 52 finds its way back to the Customs’ Yuma office, agent Hale received a “letter of reprimand” – agent Hale is not very happy because he reported to this writer that other non-Hispanic special agents committed similar and worse offenses such as losing a particular classified sensitive official document (SOD). Hale reported how another Hispanic agent got a letter of reprimand for losing an SOD document, while a non-Hispanic White agent did the same and received no disciplinary action.

This writer advised agent Hale to let his management know that filing a false police report and entering false information into the National Crime Information Computer (NCIC) is a serious federal offense. NCIC maintains a database of information about such things as stolen cars, stolen boats, guns, missing persons, wanted persons, arrest records. It provides quick access to these records by State, Local and Federal law enforcement agencies. NCIC is directly linked with the U.S. Treasury Department's TECS computer and many State computer systems. The FBI manages the NCIC, which by itself is a division within the FBI. If a particular law enforcement agency, federal, state, county or local agency is found to be misusing NCIC, an agency can lose its certification to use the NCIC system. By the way, misuse of TECS or NCIC or making and filing a false police report is one of the favorite tools used by the Legacy Customs and now ICE or CBP to retaliate against employees who are deemed “trouble makers” (employees who file legitimate complaints of discrimination or report criminal misconduct by their supervisors or managers.)

On February 8, 2001 at 11:10 am, GROUP SUPERVISOR David Franklin Fry called the Yuma Police to report a “found property” incident report. YPO N. Matheron, badge number 0898. Squad PS2 took the call and report. According to the report the on February 7, 2001, at 3:00 pm, shotgun was found at the U.S. Customs’ office, 3911 Pico Avenue, Yuma, AZ 85365.

YPO Matheron wrote on his narrative the following:

“Recovered Gun

PROPERTY RECOVERED:

One (1) Remington 870 Shotgun, Serial Number W381112M; NCIC Number G777553309

NARRATIVE: On 2-8-01 at 1110 hours FRY called to report the recovered the listed shotgun. He said the gun was located in the Customs Office Firearm Room 3911 Pico Avenue on 2-7-01 at about 1400 hrs. Fry said the gun was not stolen but misplaced. Dispatch was given a copy of this supplement. No further action was taken.

STATUS OF THE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THIS CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY :

Steve D. ARIZAGA - retired in 2002 - He took an “early retirement”

David F. FRY - within a few months ofter his promotion to group supervisor, he got promoted to be the RAC for the Customs’ Office of Investigations in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Later he was promoted and relocated to the El Paso, Texas where he is currently the Deputy SAC, GS-1811-15.

Kyle E. Barnette - was promoted to be a deputy SAC in Tucson, AZ and later moved to Phoenix, AZ. His next move was a lateral transfer to ICE’s Office of Investigations, New Orleans where he retired but immediately re-applied for a security job either with ICE or CBP under a “double dipping” program.

Rory B. HALE – was temporarily promoted to an Assistant Attaché, GS-1811-14, in Brasilia, Brazil. Upon completion of his foreign assignment of 4 or 6 years he returned to the USA and was sent to the ICE, SAC’s Office of Investigation, Houston, TX where he is a special agent.

References:

The above press release and the entire U.S. Congressional hearing can be found at the first link listed below:

INABILTY OF THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS FIREARMS: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION FEBRUARY 23, 1993 Serial 103-40

http://www.archive.org/stream/inabilityofuscus00unit/inabilityofuscus00unit_djvu.txt

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I—CRIMES - CHAPTER 47--FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS

http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030NEW.htm

Federal Computer Crime Laws

www.sans.org/reading_room/papers/index.php?id=1446

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PRESS RELEASE #3 - FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1993 SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1135 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BLDG. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 - TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5522 - THE HONORABLE J. J. PICKLE (D, TEXAS), CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ANNOUNCES A HEARING ON THE INABILITY OF THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS FIREARMS

The Honorable J. J. Pickle (D., Texas), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, announced today that the Subcommittee will conduct a hearing on the failure of the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) to correct long-standing problems in accounting for its firearms.

The hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, February 23, 1993, beginning at 2:00 p.m., in the main Committee hearing room, 1100 Longworth House Office Building. The Subcommittee will receive testimony from the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Inspector General (Treasury IG), a former employee of Customs' National Firearms Program staff, and a representative of Customs. Customs maintains an inventory of more than 20,000 firearms for use by its 3,000 special agents, 7,000 inspectors, and various managers. The inventory is made up of purchased firearms, forfeited firearms, firearms transferred from other agencies, and firearms abandoned by importers.

In May 1991, the Subcommittee initiated an investigation into allegations of lost and stolen firearms at Customs. These same allegations had been made to Customs managers, the Customs Office of Internal Affairs, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Treasury IG, starting as early as 1984. The Subcommittee confirmed a number of the allegations and, more importantly, determined that the Customs managers had been ignoring the problem for years.

During the early stages of the Subcommittee's investigation, the Treasury IG initiated an audit of the Customs Firearms Program. By agreement with the Treasury IG and senior Customs managers, the Subcommittee suspended its investigation pending the outcome of the Treasury IG's audit. The Treasury IG's audit report was recently completed and submitted to the Subcommittee and Customs.

The Treasury IG reports that Customs' accountability over firearms is ineffective and, as a result, increases the potential for undetected theft, loss, or unauthorized diversion of firearms. The IG identified missing firearms; firearms in the possession of former Customs employees; and firearms listed in active use which, in fact, had been destroyed.

In announcing the hearing, Chairman Pickle stated: "We were not surprised to discover that the Treasury IG's audit found the Customs Firearms Program in shambles. I agree with the Treasury IG that proper firearm accountability is necessary to prevent the loss, undetected theft, and diversion of firearms. Lost, stolen, or improperly diverted firearms could cause embarrassment to Customs if subsequently used in the commission of a crime.

"A whistleblower came to the Subcommittee in early 1991 documenting a number of problems with the Customs Firearms Program, including several lost or stolen Customs firearms which no one seemed to care about.

"In one case, the whistleblower documented nine firearms which disappeared in 1983. The documentation shows that the firearms were in the possession of a former Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs. He returned them six days

after the Subcommittee requested specific information from Customs regarding those firearms. The firearms had been unaccounted for eight years. The Treasury IG identified additional instances where firearms were taken by separated and retired Customs employees.

"The Customs employee who blew the whistle on problems with the firearms program spent years trying to get Customs management to correct the problems before coming to the Subcommittee. Instead of correcting the problems, Customs managers fired the whistleblower. Moreover, when the Subcommittee made its first formal request for information regarding the firearms program in May 1991, Customs claimed that the program had undergone extensive review by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs and the Treasury IG and that there was no indication of major problems.

"This attitude cannot be tolerated. Recent reforms initiated by former Customs Commissioner Hallett were aimed at correcting this attitude. However, it is unclear that those efforts have been effective in improving Customs' management of firearms. It is imperative that Customs learns to accept its problems and deal with them directly and forthrightly.