"El temblor viene desde abajo, carajo."

I don't mean to jump the gun, but it's likely that Evo Morales could be the next President within months. And yet, he has never said he supports nationalization, so naturally he would delegate this decision to the Asamblea Constituyente, which he would presumably call for to prevent alienating the bases. Right? "Who knows," I guess, is the only honest answer.
Indeed, as our dedicated reporters have said (thanks to all of you, ¡fuerza!), there are more questions now than answers. How will the U.S. respond to the new situation? Will the oligarchs in Santa Cruz and elsewhere take advantage of the current weakness of the state? How will the OAS respond to its first real test after rejecting the U.S. intervention proposal? Importantly, how will El Alto, the La Paz provinces, the campesinos, the miners, the unions, the bases of the MAS, students and other popular social sectors respond to the uncertainties facing the country?

Bolivia's social movements may soon be faced with a "friendly" government in power, especially if the Constituyente is held and allowed to proceed with honest representation. Presumably, the new government backed by a new Constitution would better serve the people that have repeatedly turned out en masse in the streets. That is, of course, unless the process itself is derailed, implodes, or sends the country into a deeper, more violent internal confrontation.

But if it succeeds, hopefully then, Bolivia will come closer to achieving what no other uprising in América has been able to do (despite its popularity as a rallying call): "¡Que se vayan todos! Que no quede uno solo..." ("Throw them all out! Don't leave a single one behind..." in reference to the entire political class) This would mean nothing other than the radical "re-founding of the country," as the Constituyente is often described by Bolivians. Undoubtedly, reactionary forces, of which there are plenty, will try to block this endeavor.  

Amid this uncertainty, our role in this forum and others remains very much the same: foremost, we need to carefully monitor the actions and words of the U.S. government and local elites; similarly, as Al Giordano has already begun, the commercial media must be critically analyzed and the real "news" of what's happening must be dutifully reported (as our auténticos on the ground have admirably done, and will surely continue to do); much attention must also be paid to accurately representing what Bolivia's social movements propose (again, I commend our reporters for this).

For instance, some sources have disparagingly characterized Bolivia’s situation as a "mobocracy." It is never presented as a scenario with an organized, calculating opposition that has chosen to operate through direct action because of an environment where votes don't count, where majorities are radically excluded and where "elections are limited to a competition between carefully managed elites," as one researcher has noted. Nor is it pointed out that Bolivia is really an autocracy where presidents rule by decree, which is what got us to this point in the first place (Decree 21060 unleashed the neoliberal model, privatizing practically everything). And rarely do reports present the social movements as having anything other than a "laundry list" of unreasonable demands (Nationalization? "Oh my!"). Washington and Wall Street and the many energy companies with investments in Bolivia’s oil and gas sector are staring Bolivians in the eye, threatening to pull out investments and sue the country for billions if even modest changes are made to energy concession contracts, let alone nationalization.

Undeterred, Bolivia's movements have concrete demands and nationalization remains at the top of the list. What’s more, these demands are attainable; the power of global capital notwithstanding, because luckily, Bolivia has something the world (especially, the developed part) can’t do without: oil and gas.